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CHAPTER I 
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLfl~ 
Rationale 
Few institutions in the United States command the widespread 
attention received by the public schools. Several possible 
explanations for this zealous concern merit discussion. First, 
citizens have a financial stake in the school system. Traditionally, 
the schools have served local needs, and they have been locally 
administered and funded. Taxpayers simply want to be sure they are 
getting their money's worth. Second, the schools are interwoven into 
the fabric of the community. They are not just places to which 
children are sent to be educated. They provide adults with an 
opportunity to participate in school-related activities. Parents are 
eager to join PTA's, sponsor Cub Scout troops, and raise money for 
needed playground equipment. In many towns and neighborhoods, the 
schools are activity centers; their facilities are used for adult 
education and community recreation. Finally, the public school is the 
primary transmitter of community values. As such, it is regarded as 
the property of each and every member of the community. Schools 
perform the vital service of educating and training the most important 
possession of the community: its children. 
Given the emotional and financial investment of the citizenry, it 
is little wonder that they are interested in school policies and 
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programs. And given the variety of opinions reflective of that 
interest, it is little wonder that the public school system is often 
the center of public controversy. The problem is that in the face of 
change--political, social, and economic--interests intensify, opinions 
harden, and controversy can turn into conflict. And because change, 
both within the schools and in their social environment, is constant 
and ongoing, controversy is inevitable and conflict is always 
possible. 
Furthermore, the changes in the public schools in the last 
decade, mirroring the changes in society at large, have resulted in an 
increase in disagreement over educational policies and growing 
controversy within the schools. One source of potential conflict, for 
example, has been falling enrollments. Because of the decline in the 
birth rate, fewer children have been entering schools. Indeed, many 
school districts undertook ambitious building programs to accommodate 
the expansion of the school age population caused by the baby boom 
after World War II. School boards have had to face the task of 
closing some schools and reassigning children to others. Communities 
have therefore been forced to rethink the concept of the neighborhood 
school and deal with the choice between selling or renting school 
buildings and busing students, on the one hand, and imposing higher 
taxes, on the other. Some districts have been able to control the 
level of conflict generated by such changing social conditions. 
Others have not. 
Confronted by continuous change, school boards need to devote 
their energies to developing forward-looking policies, maintaining 
fiscal management, and establishing sound educational planning. In 
order to formulate policies and make plans, boards must be able to 
work together. They cannot afford to waste time on political 
infighting and community disputes. And they must feel free to speak 
openly and deliberate disinterestedly. 
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In moderation, public discussion and debate can be stimulating to 
the school system. However, if they are carried to an extreme, they 
can lead to widespread discontent and dissension. The resulting 
conflict is a problem because it can produce hostilities that divide 
communities and create wounds that may take years to mend. Nussel 
(1964) concluded that open conflict in school affairs should be 
avoided because it results in intergroup cleavage, animosity, and 
residual bitterness. In addition, the effect on the school leadership 
can be devastating. Schools and school administrators can lose 
credibility, and they may be compelled to spend an inordinate amount 
of time examining, redefining, and defending programs and policies. 
For these reasons, school boards must be able to manage 
controversy before it turns into conflict. They must retain public 
support and preserve an atmosphere of decision making that is 
hospitable to new ideas and unharried discussion. In order to do so, 
they must find ways of channeling community discontent into useful 
activities and transforming potentially inflammable issues into 
subjects of rational argument and calm deliberation. If members of 
the school board are afraid of close scrutiny by impassioned partisan 
interests, they may be unable to discuss the issues. And if they 
themselves have become caught up in the heat of public controversy, 
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they may be unable to make any decisions at all. 
Ever since the establishment of the American public school system 
in the nineteenth century, it has been subjected to widespread and 
frequent criticism. The most recent example is the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education report entitled A Nation at 
Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. The Commission's 
evaluation of the public school system is grim. The report says that 
the United States is economically and otherwise endangered because 
world competitors are overtaking U.S. positions in science, 
technology, and industry. And this is the case, the Commission says, 
because mediocrity had become the norm in American education. That 
is, the public school systems are simply not working as the public 
believes they should be. 
Although the report is pessimistic in its assessment of American 
schools, it is not hopeless. And its recommendations for reform bear 
directly on the problem under discussion. Among the five major 
proposals offered by the Commission is the need for capable school 
leadership. Several recent studies (Madden, 1976; Edmonds, 1978; and 
Rutter, 1979) support this view. How can the academic achievement of 
students be improved? These studies argue that among the factors 
characterizing schools with high student achievement is an emphasis on 
improving the instructional effectiveness of teachers. And all three 
contend that this emphasis derives mainly from school administrators. 
That is, strong administrative leadership influences teacher 
performance, which in turn influences student achievement. The result 
is a reverse domino effect from the top down: under these 
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circumstances, children can learn to their maximum potential. 
Is there a relationship between increasing conflict and 
increasing mediocrity? Common sense answers yes. Suffice it to say, 
however, that unless conflict is controlled, the perception of 
mediocrity will not be eliminated. For even if the diversion of 
administrative energies into the task of conflict management did not 
foment the problem identified by the Commission, the continued sapping 
of resources by public discontent, controversy, and conflict will 
deter, if not prevent, school leaders from solving the problem of 
instructional mediocrity in the future. 
Statement of the Problem 
In light of the conclusions reached by the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education (1983) and other national reports, it is 
obviously important to discover how school boards can be permitted to 
concentrate on the job of improving public education instead of having 
to deal with conflict. Or, stated differently, school boards need to 
discover how to control conflict so that they can devote themselves to 
the ongoing principal concern of citizens: academic achievement. 
School district superintendents are in a unique position to deal 
with the problem. As the chief administrative officers in the school 
system, they carry the primary responsibility for initiating and 
administering programs designed to improve the quality of public 
education. Furthermore, superintendents bear a large part of the 
responsibility for making the system run smoothly and efficiently. 
They must deal day to day with a variety of constituencies--teachers, 
parents, and board members--all of whom are very likely to address the 
problems of public education in different ways. And they must find 
ways to accommodate and/or resolve these differences. As the report 
of the National Commission (1983) concluded, school leadership cannot 
be effective without cooperation between administrations and boards. 
Nor can leadership be effective without the cooperation of all those 
who have an interest in the school system--the entire community. 
How can superintendents fulfill these responsibilities, 
especially in relation to the problem of conflict? First, they can 
help create an atmosphere of cooperation by understanding their 
constituencies, particularly the school board whose policies guide 
them and the communities whose interests they serve. More 
specifically, they can achieve this objective by understanding how 
these groups deal with conflict. Then, with that understanding, they 
can respond quickly and effectively when potential conflict arises. 
6 
Thus, if a superintendent knows that the school board he/she is 
responsible to is about to receive a major complaint or encounter any 
potentially divisive issue, he/she can spend time helping the board 
develop constructive ways of handling differences of opinion, either 
by working directly with members or by bringing in outside 
consultants. If the dispute arises from the community, he/she can 
recommend the use of persuasive techniques or the establishment of 
procedures for hearing, examining, and ultimately settling the 
disagreement. Being aware of long term trends and changes, he/she may 
suggest alternatives in the board's decision-making process or in its 
committee structure that would enhance its ability to deal with these 
trends and changes. Or he/she may recommend the establishment of 
citizen committees or the institution of a caucus system of board 
member selection in order to give community members a feeling of 
fuller participation and greater control. 
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If, for example, a school district needed to raise money, the 
superintendent could counsel the school board as to the best way to 
accomplish its goal. Knowing that members of the community had openly 
expressed opposition to a tax increase, the superintendent would try 
to dissuade the board from raising property taxes by means of a 
referendum. Similarly, if a school district decided to reduce the 
size of its special education programs and the superintendent knew 
that the parents of students in these programs would resist such a 
change, he/she would recommend ways of presenting the proposal to 
parents that would allay their fears and diminish their opposition. 
Clearly, to create controversy and risk conflict are unproductive 
for effective administrative behavior. Fortunately, superintendents 
are in a position to prevent this from happening by virtue of their 
access to all their constituencies. If they take the time to 
understand the groups they are dealing with and pay attention to 
changing social conditions, they can assist school boards in timing 
their proposals carefully, selecting their options with a due sense of 
their impact on the community, and using effective methods for 
presenting new ideas. During personal interviews conducted for this 
study, superintendents stressed again and again the importance of 
understanding their boards, including their strengths and weaknesses, 
and being able to gauge their ability to make certain decisions and 
deal with certain issues. Obviously, the same point applies to 
superintendents in relation to teachers, parents, political groups, 
and service organizations that make up the community. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this research study was to determine how school 
administrators can work more effectively with their constituencies. 
The study assumes that the more superintendents know about their 
constituencies, the better able they will be to help and direct their 
energies. With this assumption in mind, the study was designed to 
answer four general areas of inquiry: 
1. Was there a difference as measured by electoral conflict in 
school elections between school districts that were ranked high and 
those that were ranked low on the social characteristics of the 
members of their communities? 
2. On which types of issues did boards of education experience 
internal conflict, as indicated by split votes during the regularly 
scheduled meetings and were there any differences on the types of 
split votes between those communities that ranked high and those that 
ranked low on the social characteristics of the community members? 
3. Was the level of conflict evident in the district, as 
indicated by electoral participation and dissent, related to the 
issues that produced recorded conflict among board members? 
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4. Did the presence of a caucus system of selecting school board 
members have an effect on the level of conflict within the district? 
Although every board of education is composed of members who 
differ in terms of their experience and philosophical orientation, 
board members are likely to have some common characteristics that are 
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reflective of the community they represent. And because communities 
differ, it is necessary to study them in order to understand their 
boards. For that reason, this study is also concerned with the manner 
in which communities handle change and manage the problems that 
inevitably arise from differences in values and attitudes and from the 
existence of competing demands for limited resources. 
The Theoretical Framework 
To answer these questions, this study examined school board 
decisions; community social characteristics; manifestations of 
dissatisfaction with schools in general; and electoral processes. In 
order to determine the relationships among these factors affecting the 
public school system, this study also examined the extent to which 
each factor influenced the others. 
The relationships between these factors have been studied by 
several students of public education. Minar (1966) investigated 
" ••. the links between the school system and its social environment" 
(p. 824), especially the influence of the latter on the former. 
Specifically, he was interested in the social causes and effects 
" ..• of conflict in school district politics" (p. 823). Focusing on 
electoral conflict and basing his study on a combination of election 
and referenda dissent to indicate control or lack of control of 
conflict, he hypothesized that a community's success in conflict 
control was directly related to certain social characteristics: "The 
ability of a community to suppress conflict is dependent on its 
resources in certain kinds of outlooks and skills and ••. these are 
related to aggregate levels of educational and occupational status" 
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(p. 825). 
Using rank-order correlation coefficients between aggregate 
community political behavior and social characteristics of community 
members for his analysis, Minar found that there were significant 
associations between political variables and status variables. The 
higher status communities were more able to manage conflict for 
several reasons. First, communities that were accustomed to the 
division of responsibility that leadership entails were more amenable 
to leadership. Low-manifest-conflict systems were adept at 
dissipating controversy before it reached the threshhold at which the 
less attached groups (parents, teachers, and non-administrative school 
personnel) became involved. Also, "high-status, low-conflict 
districts are more likely to lean more heavily on technical authority, 
to hire experts, retain them for long periods of time, and grant them 
considerable decision latitude" (pp. 831-32). Second, "high-status 
communities have less conflict on school affairs because they are less 
differentiated internally by 'class' lines and because people of 
similar class either work better together or have similar aspirations" 
(p. 828). Third, :t-linar' s results suggested that conflict was more 
easily handled in areas with high socioeconomic status because there 
were more human and financial resources available for solving 
problems. 
Minar also studied the relationship between electoral processes 
and conflict management. Focusing on the use of the caucus system of 
nominating candidates for school board membership as a conflict 
management mechanism, Minar concluded that " ••• high-rank communities 
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are not only more likely to have caucuses but are more likely to have 
them work as conflict-management devices" (p. 831). Stated in other 
terms, he found that higher socioeconomic communities developed 
methods like the caucus system to reinforce the conflict-suppression 
capacity of a system and to keep conflict at a sub- or prepublic 
level. 
Two decades have passed since Minar investigated some of the 
questions raised in this study. This study was undertaken to 
determine whether the conclusions Minar drew in the 1960s are still 
valid in the 1980s. Before proceeding with that determination, 
however, a few words about the generalizability of the findings in 
this study are in order. 
First, the sample from which the school districts were selected 
was representative of many school districts in the United States. The 
districts ranged from small, with a kindergarten through eighth-grade 
enrollment of 190 students, to medium, with an enrollment of almost 
5,000 students. Only elementary districts were selected because the 
elementary districts in Illinois tend to have the same or nearly the 
same boundaries as the politically defined communities they serve. 
Thus, the conclusions in this study are generalizable to the extent 
that they are drawn from a variety of school districts. 
Second, the data collected from the sample were unobtrusively 
obtained. They were derived from official records of past events, 
including legal documents, board meeting minutes, and voting 
eligibility records obtained from the county clerks of the various 
counties in which the school districts are located. Voting data were 
either exact statistical accounts or official estimates used for all 
government purposes. Voting participation data were taken directly 
from school board records for the first three years of the study and 
from the records of county clerks for the final two years of the 
study. This is because elections were conducted by school districts 
from 1978 to 1980 and by counties thereafter. In 1980, the Illinois 
General Assembly passed a law consolidating elections, which also 
resulted in the cancellation of school board elections in 1982. The 
terms of current members were extended until the 1983 election. 
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Third, the social characteristics of each community were not 
determined by subjective impressions of school administrators, but 
were based on information obtained from the United States Census. The 
data were aggregated to ascertain the social rank of each community on 
the basis of standard sociological determinants. 
Limitations of the Study 
The general applicability of this study has three limitations. 
First, because of the need to deal with a manageable sample of 
communities in which the school district more or less corresponds to 
community municipal boundaries, the sample does not represent all 
types of districts and communities in the United States. For example, 
no large urban districts were included because they are heterogeneous. 
They were beyond the scope of this study. For the same reason, high 
school districts, which usually serve more than one community, were 
not included in the sample. 
Second, although every effort was made to define school district 
boundaries accurately in order to ensure uniformity of comparative 
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data, not all school districts had boundaries that were exactly 
coternimous with a city or town. Thus, the relationships between 
school boards and communities, at least in some cases, may be slightly 
distorted. 
Third, the social characteristics of the communities were taken 
from the 1980 Census. Although it was assumed that the communities 
remained fundamentally unchanged from 1980 to 1983, this assumption 
will not be verifiable until the 1990 Census. 
A final limitation on this internal validity of the 
pre-experimental design used in this study is that of experimental 
workability. The evidence of group differences in conflict management 
over the five year period could be due to the differential drop-out of 
persons in the school community. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Before we examine the data collected for this report it will be 
useful to review a number of research studies whose conclusions bear 
on the questions raised in this investigation. These studies deal 
with four relevant issues: (1) the role of school boards in the 
management of public schools; (2) the methods of selecting school 
board members; (3) the effects of community social status on voter 
behavior and attitudes toward school officials; and (4) the role of 
the superintendents in school ~anagement and conflict control. 
The Role of School Boards 
Because there was no provision for education in the constitution 
of the United States, the legal basis for public schools was 
constitutionally established by the individual states. Initially, the 
schools were run by town governments. After 1825, however, the towns 
began to establish separate governing committees--boards of education. 
The duties of these boards were to establish schools, to make rules 
for their management and governance, to operate them, to raise and 
expend money for their support, and eventually to employ 
superintendents to administer some of these functions. In this way, 
the control of public education fell into the hands of the townspeople 
whose primary function was to oversee the education of the children in 
their districts (Campbell et al., 1975). 
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Most students of public education agree that school boards both 
control the school system and express the will of the community. 
According to Lutz (1980), for example, local boards are grass-roots, 
democratic institutions. At the same time, however, school boards are 
sometimes perceived by their constituents to be insufficiently 
responsive to community demands and expectations and insufficiently 
open and democratic in their decision making. Lutz explored several 
theories that account for school board behavior in these areas. The 
first, the continuous competition theory, asserts that although school 
boards are under constant pressure from various interest groups, they 
usually act for the good of their school district. Second, the 
decision output theory states that school boards are undemocratic 
because they do not respond to the demands of the public. Third, the 
dissatisfaction theory assumes that school boards are ultimately 
democratic because they are subject to defeat as a result of community 
dissatisfaction. And fourth, in terms of the council behavior theory, 
which locates group behavior on a continuum from "elite" to "arena", 
school boards usually act in an elite fashion. Assuming the role of 
trustees, they reach their decisions by consensus in private meetings 
and enact their policies in public by unanimous vote. Although the 
majority of the school boards Lutz studied acted in this matter, some 
exhibited arena behavior, which displays open conflict and requires 
change that typically results in the electing of a new council, which 
also exhibits elite behavior. 
Regardless of which theory one accepts, however, it is clear that 
school boards do not govern in a vacuum. Indeed, after a thorough 
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review of the literature, Boyd (1976b) concluded that school 
administrators tend to dominate local educational policy making, bu·t 
within constraints imposed by the local community through the board of 
education. This is so partly because school boards are inclined to 
employ superintendents who hold beliefs similar to their own. And 
their own beliefs are reflective, in turn, of beliefs of the 
community. In other words, superintendents are influenced by school 
boards, and school boards are influenced by the community. Boyd says 
that the constraints imposed on the superintendent vary with the type 
of school district and the type of policy issue he/she is faced with. 
However, superintendents and boards of education usually attempt to 
act in harmony with what they perceive to be expectations of the 
community. In homogeneous districts, in particular, school boards and 
superintendents tend to anticipate community needs and reflect 
community values. 
Yet, despite the attempts of many school boards and school 
administrators to work together and despite the fact that both groups 
usually attain their positions of authority because they reflect the 
values of the communities they serve, there is obviously no guarantee 
that they will be able to govern smoothly and effectively. As Lutz 
(1980) points out, even though they may try to act for the good of the 
entire community, school officials cannot satisfy the demands of every 
interest group. Consequently, they are often accused of being 
unresponsive. Furthermore, because they typically deliberate behind 
closed doors, they are always subject to the charge of elitism. If 
dissatisfaction deepens, it can turn into opposition. And if it 
broadens, it can lead to open conflict, which can result in 
superintendent dismissal and school board defeat. 
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Before we consider the ways in which school administrators can 
aid school boards in minimizing opposition and managing conflict, we 
must examine two important conflict-related variables, both of which 
have been extensively studied by educational researchers. The first 
variable, the method of selecting school board members, can be 
influenced by school officials. That is, they can promote and support 
the methods they perceive to be conducive to conflict control. The 
second variable, the social status of the community, is not subject to 
influence because it is a socioeconomic given. However, if school 
officials understand the relationship between community social status 
and conflict, they can at least be aware of its potentially good or 
ill effect in their own school districts and thereby maximize the 
former and minimize the latter. 
The Selection of School Board Members 
Members of the board of education are entrusted with the 
important responsibility of running the schools. Therefore, 
well-qualified candidates are needed to serve on the board. How are 
they selected? 
Throughout the states there are two primary methods of selecting 
school board members: election and appointment. According to Campbell 
et al., (1975) about 25% of the school boards in the United States are 
appointed, usually by the mayor with city council approval. In the 
remaining 75% of U.S. school districts, boards are elected at large in 
nonpartisan elections. 
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The specific qualifications for school board membership vary from 
state to state, but there are many commonalities. In Illinois, for 
example, there are certain qualifications and procedures for running 
for the position of school board member. Candidates must be 18 years 
of age or older, residents of the school district for one year, and 
registered voters in their district on the day of the election 
(Murphy, 1977). The candidate must file a nominating petition 
supporting his candidacy and an ethics statement. The petition must 
be signed by at least 50 voters or 10% of the registered voters of the 
district, whichever is less. Candidates cannot be employees of the 
school district or hold other public offices. 
Which method is best for securing effective school board members? 
Hurwitz (1972) lists three advantages of the elective method. First, 
an elected board is more responsive to the public. Second, an elected 
board owes allegiance to no person or political party. Finally, an 
elected board protects the school system from local partisan politics. 
Furthermore, Burris (1969) indicates that the elective process usually 
results in the selection of well-qualified candidates. School board 
members receive no salary, spend countless hours per week on school 
board business, and leave themselves open to public criticism. Yet, 
the typical board member, according to the American School Board 
Journal (1983), has a high level of income, works in a 
professional/managerial job, and has completed four or more years of 
college. And the typical elected board member ranks even higher in 
these categories. As Burris (1969) says, "There is something to the 
man who is willing to run, something that sets him apart in his desire 
to give his best capacities to the public welfare" (p.l3). Thus, 
although Muns (1961) contends that there are no substantive 
differences between elected and appointed board members in terms of 
their actions, there is every reason to conclude that election is 
preferable to appointment. 
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Tuttle (1958) has proposed a set of desirable traits for school 
board members. The effective board member, he says, believes in 
public education, is devoted to the public interest, has sound 
judgement, possesses breadth of view, is cooperative, and has a faith 
in people. How do communities attract qualified candidates to the 
school board? In some communities, individuals seek the position of 
school board member. In other communities, interested groups select 
and support candidates, while in still other communities current board 
members encourage persons they know to seek board membership. 
One method of board member selection, which is used in a variety 
of school districts throughout the United States (Hurwitz, 1972), is 
the community caucus. Tuttle defines it as " ••. a body of 
representatives of a school district voluntarily associated together 
for the purpose of canvassing, screening, and nominating the best 
available candidates for school board membership, whether the final 
selection is to be by popular election or appointment" (1958, p. 152). 
The procedure followed by a citizen's nominating committee in 
Great Neck, New York, has been outlined by Tourstein (1963). Each 
potential candidate submitted a biographical sketch, appeared before 
the committee, stated his position on education in general, and 
answered questions from the committee. 
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Tuttle (1958) views the caucus as an effective device for 
securing highly qualified school board members because it allows fo~ a 
fairly thorough examination of every candidate and an evaluation of 
all candidates in comparison to each other. Muns (1964) also found 
the caucus to be a systematic and controlled method of screening 
candidates for board membership. 
Two other studies of the caucus method bear on the question of 
candidate selection. In an investigation of 110 Indiana school 
districts that elected members of their school boards, Lawrence (1965) 
obtained his data through a postal card survey. Nineteen of these 
districts used the caucus system for nominating members to the school 
board. Lawrence interviewed the superintendent, an officer of the 
caucus, and a school board member in each of the 19 districts. He 
found that 85% of the board members in those districts had been 
nominated by caucus, the caucuses had been started by school or civic 
groups, the median size of the caucuses was 32 members, the median 
number of candidates screened was 51, and 85% of the caucuses slated 
one candidate for each vacancy. 
Lawrence concluded that the caucus was effective in securing 
well-qualified candidates if it: (1) represented all segments of the 
school district, (2) was well publicized, (3) established desirable 
criteria for the selection of nominees, and (4) permitted all members 
to participate in the final screening. 
In an extensive 1960-1961 study of 71 elementary and high school 
districts in Lake, DuPage, and Cook counties in Illinois, Muns (1961) 
investigated 64 caucus committees. By analyzing the constitutions of 
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the caucus, he found that their size varied from 5 to 122 members, but 
50% had fewer then 30 members. The average number of meetings held. 
per year for the entire caucus was two. Having developed from a 
combination of representatives of groups interested in education, the 
caucuses appeared to be a major force in securing candidates for 
school boards. 
Among superintendents, school presidents, and caucus officers, 
95% felt that the system secured well-qualified members in communities 
in which it was used. Among elected members, 67% to 72% would not 
have sought school board positions if the caucus had not solicited 
them. 
In an extensive study of elementary districts in suburban 
Chicago, Minar (1966) examined the caucus as a conflict-management 
device. One-half of the districts in his sample used nominating 
caucuses, which Minar defined as independent organizations working 
under by-laws and rules, whose purpose is to select qualified 
candidates for school board positions. In his study, Minar found that 
caucus members frequently consulted, either overtly or covertly, with 
school board members and school administrators. The major function of 
the caucus, in Minar's view, is to "handle conflict before it reaches 
the level of visibility" (p. 829). 
The research into the issue of school board members selection may 
be summarized as follows. First, the elective, as opposed to the 
appointive, method of membership selection results in the acquisition 
of better-qualified members and the minimalization of 
political/partisan influence on school board members who are better 
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able to reduce conflict. Thus, to the extent that school officials 
are interested in conflict management and to the extent that they can 
influence their communities to use the caucus and elective methods of 
board member selection, the foregoing studies indicate that they 
should encourage their communities to adopt both methods. 
The Social Status of Communities 
Minar's (1966) study of 48 elementary school districts in 
suburban Cook County, Illinois, from 1958 to 1962 focused primarily on 
the relation between socioeconomic status and conflict control. 
Examining school districts as political systems, Minar concluded that 
the level of electoral conflict varied from district to district. In 
order to determine the cause of this variation, he hypothesized that 
community social status is directly related to the level of conflict 
within the school district. Using board and referenda elections as a 
basis for judgement, he concluded that school districts that were 
ranked high socioeconomically had a low level of participation in 
elections and also had a low level of dissent within the community. 
Attempting to explain this difference, Minar offered three 
hypotheses. First, communities with high levels of better-educated 
people and people in professional/managerial occupations had low 
conflict because they had a large supply of conflict-management skills 
and attitudes. That is "the ability of a community to suppress 
conflict is dependent on its resource in certain kinds of outlooks and 
skills and .•. these are related to aggregate levels of educational 
and occupational status" (p. 825). Second, these high-status 
communities placed more reliance on and granted more latitude to 
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superintendents in the decision-making process. And third, these 
communities had less conflict in school affairs because they were less 
differentiated internally by class lines and because people of similar 
class either work better together or have similar aspirations. In 
addition, lHnar found that the caucus was used as "a tool of conflict 
management" in high-status/low conflict districts (p. 830). 
Using Minar's study as a reference point, Boyd (1976a) examined 
eight elementary school districts in suburban Cook County, Illinois. 
He concluded, as did Minar, that high-status districts had low levels 
of conflict and low-status districts had high levels. 
Boyd based his analysis of social status on income, education, 
and occupation data drawn from the 1960 census. He defined conflict 
in terms of electoral results and between election dissent as 
determined by interviews, board minutes, newspaper coverage, and other 
sources. 
Boyd explained his results by citing the findings of Banfield and 
Wilson (1963) who divided communities into two types depending on the 
extent of their participation in the political structure. Boyd's 
high-status school districts are similar to Banfield and Wilson's 
white-collar communities, in which power is invested in established 
civic organizations dedicated to serving the entire community. And 
Boyd's low-status communities, in which power is invested in disparate 
interest groups, hotly contest elections are welcome, and political 
conflict is actually enjoyed. In this respect, variations in conflict 
are not a function of differences in competence, as Minar argues, but 
of differences in political style--a matter of choice, not of 
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unalterable socioeconomic determinants. 
To what extent do community social status and political cultur·e 
or style affect the behavior of school boards? Blanchard (1973) 
sought to answer the question in his study of 57 Kentucky school 
districts. Deriving his data from questionnaires completed by school 
board members on community social characteristics and school board 
election results, he concluded that the ability of the boards to 
control conflict was directly related to the social status of their 
communities: the higher the status, the higher the ability. 
Foster (1983) examined the effects of two very different 
political cultures on the attitudes of school board members in 
homogeneous communities in Nebraska and Louisiana. Four hundred and 
four school board members participated in the research. The school 
board members in Nebraska were thought to be less politically 
ambitious, more public regarding, and more tolerant of superintendent 
independence than those from Lousiana. Analysis of the data confirmed 
the first two assumptions, as well as the participation/control ratio 
discussed by Boyd (1976b)--that is, the more politically participatory 
communities in Louisiana experienced higher levels of school-related 
conflict and lower ability to control it. 
However, Foster's data indicated that school board members in 
both states were willing to allow the superintendent to "assume a 
leadership role on educational issues ••• A majority of board members in 
both states felt that the superintendent should advocate for 
educational policy in the community" (p. 37). This finding is 
important because it shows that the type of political climate within 
the school district, or state, does not significantly affect school 
board attitudes toward superintendent autonomy and that boards 
generally give power to superintendents regardless of their own 
orientation. Foster concluded that "superintendents are no longer 
just administrators following the mandate of the board, but are 
themselves policymakers" (p. 37). Lutz (1980) also contends that 
boards run their schools "with considerable help from a trusted 
superintendent" (p. 458). 
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Nevertheless, the evidence suggest that public attitudes toward 
school officials are influenced by community social status. Minar 
(1966), for example, argues that "as far as school affairs are 
concerned, some communities are more susceptible to leadership than 
others probably because their people are more accustomed to the 
division of responsibility that leadership entails" (p. 833). That 
is, high-status community are more likely than low-status communities 
to repose more trust in school administrators and grant them more 
freedom. 
This conclusion is supported by two studies. First, Banfield and 
Grodzins (1958) found that fashionable communities inhabited by 
well-to-do business and professional people want (and can afford) a 
high level of governmental services. Proud of their schools and 
school officials, members of such communities are likely to hire 
businesslike and impartial administrators and grant them the autonomy 
their skills appear to justify (pp. 18-19). Second, Schnore and 
Alford (1963) concluded that high-status school districts prefer to 
have their school boards and superintendents operate on the model of 
council-manager form of municipal government, which in turn is based 
on a business model: "the board of directors hires a plant manager," 
and there is no illusion of democracy, except through the distant 
intervention of the stockholders ... , who get a chance to select 
mewbers of the board at the annual meeting" (p. 6.). 
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In light of the foregoing studies, it would be useful for school 
officials to know which kind of community they are serving--high 
status or low status, politically active or inactive--not because they 
can change community status or political activities (they cannot), but 
because they can take it into consideration when they are about to 
deal with potentially inflammable issues. It seems that when school 
officials are compelled to broach such an issue, low-status 
communities--regardless of the ultimate reason for their typically 
higher participation in school politics and their greater disposition 
toward volatility--require less direct methods of presentation and 
less confrontative techniques of persuasion than do high-status 
communities. 
Indeed, the research suggests that the range of sociological 
variables impinging on conflict control is wide and varied and that 
school officials would do well to be aware of all of them. Three 
variables are worth discussing briefly. 
First, voter participation may vary with community size. Milton 
(1983) studied the level of participation in school board elections in 
67 Florida counties. She found that although previous research had 
determined that voter turnout in such elections is minimal, elections 
in Florida had surprisingly high levels of participation. More 
important, she concluded that, in Florida at least, persons who lived 
in smaller districts tended to participate in elections more 
frequently than did inhabitants of larger districts. "It appears that 
bureaucratized school boards in big cities may be alienating to the 
general public. A greater proportion of rural citizens know that they 
are paying property taxes to support schools. And they also know that 
the educational system is the biggest single expenditure in their 
counties" (p. 653). 
Second, citizen's involvement in school board elections seems to 
depend on the citizen's affiliation or nonaffiliation with the school 
system. Taebel (1977) grouped voters into two general categories 
based on their motivation for voting: constituency voters, those who 
were employed by the school system or directly benefited from it, and 
clientele voters, all other members of the community. His assumptions 
were: (1) that constituent voters participate in elections in 
disproportionate numbers compared to client voters and (2) 
constituency voters were more supportive of schools and of incumbent 
board members. 
Based on a sample from one moderately sized city in the 
Southwest, Taebel's findings indicated that his proposals were 
accurate. He concluded that in order to win support for the schools, 
especially in tax rate increases and in the election of incumbent 
members to school boards, school officials should concentrate on 
constituency voters. 
Third, community interest in school issues, particularly 
elections, varies with the level of community dissatisfaction. 
Although Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) contended that most citizens 
prefer noncompetitive, or uncontested, elections, Wirt and Kirst 
(1972) have argued that citizen input is a feeble trickle with sudden 
and severe storms of local stress followed by flash floods of 
political turmoil. According to this view, when members of the 
community are dissatisfied they tend to participate more in the 
electoral process. This participation is exemplified by large voter 
turnouts, incumbent board member defeats, and involuntary 
superintendent turnovers. 
Perhaps what these three examples reveal, as much as the need for 
vigilance on the part of school officials, is the fact that when the 
issues are important voters will act (1) if they feel they can 
influence outcomes (as they are more inclined to feel in smaller 
communities), (2) if their own interests are at stake (as they are for 
constituency, as opposed to client, voters), or if they are 
dissatisfied, for whatever reason. All of this suggests that school 
systems are political as well as social systems and that 
school-related issues are always susceptible to 
political--ideolgical--reduction. As Badarak and Mitchell (1977) 
concluded, after a study of school board elections and referenda: (1) 
Political ideology is operating in school districts. (2) Politically 
active citizens can identify the ideology of school board members. 
(3) Liberalism and conservatism can be measured effectively. (4) The 
policies of school board members reflect their ideology. (5) When 
incumbents are defeated, new board members usually have an ideology 
different from that of former members. 
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The Role of the Superintendent 
The relationship between the superintendent of schools and the· 
board of education is based on an array of influences including, but 
not limited to, historical and political factors, formal and informal 
organizational structures, and a complex matrix of interpersonal 
relationships. 
Historically, American schools during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were private or church-run institutions. When 
the public school movement in the United States began in about 1800, 
the small, local district--usually a one-room school--became the 
standard unit. These local schools were governed by the selectmen of 
the towns. 
Two movements helped create the need for a superintendent 
(Campbell, 1975). The first was the combining of districts into 
citywide units. As cities and school districts grew, full-time, 
professional management was needed to direct the day-to-day 
administrative operations. City councils appointed superintendents. 
Somewhat later, boards of education became separate entities from 
municipal governments. Next, school boards were given statutory power 
to appoint superintendents. The second movement was the combining of 
rural districts into larger units. The role of the superintendent did 
not come to rural areas until the 20th century. In 1975, "about 
two-thirds of the operating school districts of the nation had a 
superintendent of schools" (Campbell, p. 199). The pattern of 
consolidation resulted in a more specialized role and the need for a 
full-time professional to manage schools. 
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The responsibility for the running of the school system is 
divided between the superintendent and the school board. The board'is 
responsible for the establishment of policy and employing a 
superintendent. The duties of the superintendent are stated in the 
Illinois School Code: "a superintendent. .. shall have charge of the 
administration of the schools under the direction of the board of 
education. In addition to the administrative duties, the 
superintendent shall make recommedations to the board concerning 
budget, building plans, the location of sites, the selection of 
teachers and other employees, the selection of textbooks, 
instructional material, and courses of study. The superintendent 
shall keep or cause to be kept the records and accounts as directed 
and required by the board, and perform such other duties as the board 
may delegate to him" (10-21.4). 
Although all school districts divide administrative 
responsibilities between the school board and the superintendent, the 
lines of demarcation are not easily drawn. In fact, allocating power 
equitably and rationally--and thereby minimizing the possibility of 
intra-administrative conflict--is one of the most important ways in 
which school leaders can contribute to the smooth functioning of a 
school system. As Minar (1966) says, "the key point in school 
government would seem to be the relations and the distribution of 
power between the superintendent and the board" (p. 831). In most 
school districts, he says, there are two types of authority: the 
technical expertise of the school administrator and the formal rank of 
the board of education. And the goal is to find the proper arena for 
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each. Other researchers explain the relationship between the board 
and its superintendent as a kind of marriage. As one school official 
put it, "we have our good times and we have our bad" (Zakariya, 1983, 
P· 28). In Zakariya's view, the division of responsibility and power 
can be solved by allowing the board to spell out the what, why, and 
how much and letting the superintendent handle the who, where, when, 
and how. 
As Minar implies, however, what makes it difficult to allocate 
power properly and effectively is the competing claims of board 
members and superintendents based on their respective prerogatives of 
rank and expertise. In other words, the board is in control and has 
the ultimate responsibility for running the schools. But the 
superintendent has the technical know-how and the administrative 
ability. In this respect, according to Wickert (1982), the "real 
issue" is whether the school board is willing to trust the 
superintendent and give him free reign, at least in his areas of 
strength. The problem is somewhat alleviated in high status-low 
conflict communities, Ninar (1966) says, because they "are likely to 
lean more heavily on technical authority, to hire experts, retain them 
for long periods of time and grant them considerable autonomy" (p. 
832). 
However, agreement on this and other issues depends on many 
factors. One important influence is the way board members and 
superintendents relate to each other based on their personal 
characteristics, such as flexibility, willingness to delegate 
authority, and ability to compromise. Bartley (1977), for example, 
has suggested that superintendents and school boards coax each other 
to agree, a tactic that cannot succeed among stubborn and unyielding 
participants. 
32 
Brodinsky (1983) states that the relationship between the board 
and the superintendent can thrive only within a total organization 
that is sound and healthy. In order to develop such an organization, 
he says, agreement should be reached at the beginning of the 
relationship between the board and the superintendent on what exactly 
board policies and prerogatives are and what is in the administrative 
domain. It is important that both school board and superintendent 
value the roles and contributions of each other. The healthy group, 
in Brodinsky's opinion, is continually searching for ways to resolve 
conflict. 
As we have seen, however, the achievement of good working 
relationships between school boards and superintendents is not enough. 
The major problem is that school officials are sometimes faced with 
external conflicts that threaten to undermine cooperation and block 
effective decision making. Thus, school boards can help themselves to 
establish harmony among all school officials by allowing 
superintendents to play out their proper (administrative) role. But 
superintendents can help school boards govern effectively by directing 
and guiding their efforts at managing conflict. According to Zeigler 
(1976), based on his study of 11 school districts, school boards 
usually allow their superintendents to be the dominant factor in 
school district decision making. However, if the superintendent does 
not take advantage of his delegated power--specifically, by giving 
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advice when it is most needed, in actual or potential conflict-related 
situations--he is not adequately playing his role because he is not 
taking on all of his responsibiities. 
How can superintendents help school boards in this regard? 
Nelson (1980) collected data from 77 superintendents in order to 
determine which strategies they used to control conflict. Two were 
reported as most often used because they were most effective. The 
first was presenting convincing evidence to support the 
superintendent's position on any given issue. The second was "timing 
the approach", or delaying action until the superintendent's success 
seemed more probable. The success of both strategies is enhanced by 
the fact, pointed out by Zeigler (1976), that superintendents control 
communications at school board meetings. 
Two other studies indicate that school boards and superintendents 
maintain their community-influenced attitudes by socializing new board 
members. Kerr (1964) conducted a study in two suburban school systems 
to find out how socialization occurred. His study shed light on both 
the control of educational policy and the selection of members for 
boards of education. Kerr found that the chief school administrator 
plays a large part in socializing the novice board member. Because of 
this socialization by the superintendent, the new board member, over 
time, begins to assign more responsibility to the administrative 
position and to depend on the administrator for information. In 
effect, selection is superceded by socialization after election. Kerr 
also concluded that the board of education acted as an "agency of 
legitimation" for administrative decisions. 
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Cistone (1977) took data from structured interviews with 40 
novice board members in Ontario, Canada. In contrast to Kerr, he 
found that over time new board members assumed a greater role in board 
deliberations. However, the new board members were very eager to 
learn the "rules of the game" and develop a code of conduct toward 
their fellow board members. In fact, Cistone concluded that new board 
members are "already well socialized into the role as a consequence of 
recruitment, preincumbent experience, and anticipatory socialization" 
(p. 31). His findings indicate that novice board members did not 
acquire new behaviors because they "shared the norms of the system 
even before they entered it" (p. 32). 
Superintendents can also help boards control conflict by 
recommending ways of reducing the likelihood and its occurrence and of 
minimizing its impact when it occurs. Two examples will suffice. 
Foskett (1962) conducted a study of community influence on school 
administration in two communities. In the first, Valley City II, a 
growing lumber town with a population of 15,000 and a low educational 
level, Foskett interviewed 65 top influentials, many of whom lived 
near Valley City III. The other community, Valley City III, in which 
Foskett interviewed 85 influentials, had a stable population of about 
50,000 and a high educational level. 
Foskett first identified the leaders in each community. 
Including only adult males, he used a modified nominating technique in 
which members of a panel representing a cross-section of the community 
submitted 10 names each. From those names, Foskett formed a second 
group called "knowledgeables", who were asked to list, in any order, 
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the 50 most influential persons in their respective communities. The 
persons named most frequently on these lists were called 
"influentials". In both cases, the knowledgeables turned out to be 
influentials as well. 
The data collection procedure involved interviews with the 
leaders to gain general information. Foskett also established a 
matrix schedule to determine the degree, areas, and reason for the 
influence of leaders. These data indicated that the influentials were 
more alike than they were different. They had a higher than average 
educational, occupational, and income level. They were married, had 
from one to three children, and were 35 to 55 years of age. They 
owned their own homes and had lived in the community for at least six 
years. Foskett thus concluded that "individuals who have a high 
education, income, and occupation somehow occupy a position in the 
social system whereby the exercise of influence is relevant and 
possible, whereas those with low education, income, and occupation 
have little chance to be a leader even if they possess appropriate 
personality traits" (p. 120). In other words, one's influence depends 
on one's position in the social system. Foskett also found that 
"influence is highly related to position gained through official 
functions or to special skills" (p. 25). Host important, these 
conclusions were equally valid for Valley City II and Valley City III. 
Foskett's study has two significant implications for school 
administrators. First, because schools are affected by influentials, 
school officials should know who they are and establish a working 
relationship with them. School officials should also have some 
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understanding of the overall social structure and how it operates. As 
Foskett says, "A recognition of the characteristics of a given 
influence structure should enable a school administrator to anticipate 
certain consequences and thus permit him to at least minimize his 
mistakes" (p. 130). 
Second, Foskett found that the attitudes and actions of 
influentials, at least in regard to school-related matters, were 
strongly influenced by the information they received from 
superintendents. Thus, superintendents can also help school boards 
work more effectively with community leaders by using the strategies 
discussed by Nelson (1980) in his own communications with 
influentials, namely presenting compelling evidence and a differing 
action until the time is right. Superintendents can do this, however, 
only if they know and understand the influentials in their own 
communities as well as--or better than--the school boards do. 
The second example of how school administrators can contribute to 
school district conflict management relates to situations in which 
conflict has already surfaced. The question is: How can school 
boards either eliminate it or reduce its impact? In a nationwide 
study of 492 board members and 81 superintendents, Stelzer (1974) 
offered three hypotheses: ( 1) "School boards employed a strategy of 
receptivity when faced with community conflict.... (2) Receptivity is 
the mechanism by which the board channels community conflict into 
opposition to the superintendent •.•. (3) Competitive elections are an 
institutional mechanism that support school board receptivity" (p. 
383). Stelzer's findings supported the hypotheses listed above. He 
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concluded that receptivity on the part of school board members acted 
as a conflict-control device. Stelzer also found that receptivity can 
be instituted by establishing channels that are either formal, such as 
committees or time on the agenda at board meetings for public 
participation, or informal, such as talking with interested citizens 
either by seeking their input or by listening to their concerns. 
These conclusions were confirmed by Adkinson (1982) in a study 
comparing the effects of eJectoral conflict on voter turnout and on 
school board decision-making style. She concluded that conflict did 
not result in a significantly larger participation of citizens in the 
electoral process. However, it did result in increased school board 
receptivity to public input and participation. The board gave 
community members more opportunity to speak at school board meetings 
and enlarged the physical space available to the public. Adkinson's 
findings also supported Stelzer's observation that as a direct 
consequence of increased receptivity dissent is projected away from 
the school as an institution and onto the superintendent as the person 
responsible for the operation of the institution. Two years later, 
this school district returned to "normal" in that the conflict had 
dissipated and the superintendent who had been hired from outside the 
system was replaced by an assistant superintendent from within the 
system. 
Although both Stelzer and Adkinson found that this 
conflict-control strategy resulted in increased difficulty for the 
superintendent involved, such results do not seem to be inevitable, 
particularly if school administrators encourage school boards to make 
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themselves more accessible and the decision-making process more open 
before conflict occurs. This is especially true if the superintendent 
himself/herself is equally accessible and open. 
To summarize: Studies of public school governance indicate that 
school board-superintendent harmony can be achieved through a division 
of administrative labor and an attempt by all parties to cooperate. 
On the school board side, cooperation requires the superintendent be 
allowed to assume certain managerial functions related to his training 
and experience. On the superintendent side, it is necessary to manage 
not only school programs and employees, but also, in some sense, the 
school board itself. Research shows that several strategies for 
dealing with the board and with the public are available to 
superintendents. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of 
these conclusions. And that is the subject of the remaining chapters 
in this report. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The first two chapters of this paper have presented the 
theoretical and research bases for this study. This chapter explains 
the research method used in the study, including the sample, data 
collection procedures, hypotheses, design, and statistical analysis. 
Sample 
Kerlinger (1973) stressed the importance of using as large and as 
representative a sample as possible in research studies to ensure the 
reliability of the conclusions. He stated that the sample should 
reflect as closely as possible the population being studied. The 
close reflection of the population by the sample is important in order 
to make sure that generalizations from the sample are accurate. For 
this study, the sample was taken from all of the public elementary 
school districts in the five county Chicago suburban area, including 
Cook, Will, Lake, DuPage, and McHenry counties. This large geographic 
area was used so that the study would include suburban communities 
representing a wide socioeconomic range. The sample also reflected a 
range in the size of the school districts. The public school 
districts chosen were obtained from the directory published by the 
Illinois State Board of Education entitled 1983-1984 Illinois Public 
School Districts and Schools (1983). 
On the basis of state directory information, school districts in 
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which all schools were located within one community were identified. 
Every school within the district had to have a mailing address to the 
same municipality in order to be included in the initial request 
letter (see Appendix A). Elementary districts were selected because 
they were more likely than high school districts to include only one 
municipality. The superintendents of these selected districts were 
sent a letter requesting their participation in the study (see 
Appendix A) and a questionnaire (see Appendix B). 
In order to compare the social characteristics of community 
members, it was necessary to use school districts whose boundaries 
were coterminous or nearly so with a municipality. This matching was 
required because the United States Census data, from which the social 
characteristic information was obtained, were presented by community. 
However, if school districts were not coternimous with a municipality, 
it was possible to combine census tracts and obtain an accurate 
picture of the social characteristics of the members of the school 
district. The combining of tracts required only simple addition. 
When it was necessary to use split tracts because of irregular school 
district boundaries, a percentage of the tract data was computed and 
then combined with the data from other tracts. This procedure rested 
on the assumption that population characteristics were evenly 
distributed over each tract. 
Whether a school district was coterminous with a municipality or 
not, it was felt that the school district constituted a new community 
unto itself that was not only associated with a town or towns, but 
also drew its identity from the various people living in the district. 
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People are members of many groups simultaneously and their group 
identity--their mutual interests and sense of shared 
responsibilities--is as definable in terms of their school district as 
it is in terms of their municipalities. 
Design 
This study used an ex post facto design to answer four research 
questions. 
1. Was there a difference as measured by electoral conflict in 
school elections between school districts that were ranked high and 
those that were ranked low on the basis of the social characteristics 
of the members of their communities? 
2. On which types of issues did boards of education experience 
internal conflict, as indicated by split votes during the regularly 
scheduled meetings and were there any differences on the types of 
split votes between those communities that ranked high and those that 
ranked low on the social characteristics of the community members? 
3. Was the level of political conflict in the district, related 
to the issues that produced recorded conflict among board members? 
4. Did the presence of a caucus system of selecting school board 
members have an effect on the level of political conflict within the 
district? 
The types of decisions made by the boards of education of each 
school district were taken from the official school board minutes. 
The decisions were categorized into four basic areas: (1) finance, 
(2) personnel, (3) curriculum, and (4) policies. A decision was 
categorized as finance if it involved payment of bills, salaries, or 
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special fees. Issues that were listed as personnel included any that 
dealt with staff members. The category of curriculum included 
applications for title money and testbook adoptions. Policies was a 
general category that included all board policies, votes on board 
organization, and any matters that could not be categorized as 
finance, personnel, or curriculum. The social characteristics of the 
community members were found by combining educational level, 
occupation, and income data secured from the 1980 United States 
Census. 
To determine the types of issues on which the school boards 
experienced internal conflict, every split vote from 1978 to 1982 was 
recorded in terms of the specific issue and the number of members 
voting aye and no. When recording a split vote abstentions were not 
considered as a split vote. 
To produce an index of political conflict for each school 
district, election results in both school board and referenda 
elections were recorded. The conflict indicators chosen, 
participation and dissent in elections, were believed to reflect the 
community's public expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
their schools. It was further hypothesized that a low voter turnout 
represented satisfaction and that votes cast for losing candidates or 
losing referenda expressed voter dissatisfaction. 
The presence or absence of the caucus system procedure for 
nominating school board candidates was ascertained through the 
questionnaire filled out by the superintendent of schools in each 
district. It was hypothesized that the caucus system served as one 
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type of conflict control mechanism. The degree to which the caucus 
system had been refined in the individual districts was not examine.d. 
Other methods of securing candidates for the board of education were 
recorded but not considered as a control device. 
Those superintendents who responded positively to the letter 
requesting their participation in the study (see Appendix A) were 
asked by telephone for permission to examine the minutes of the school 
board for the years 1978 through 1982. A follow up request for 
participation was sent approximately three weeks later to those 
superintendents who did not respond to the initial letter (see 
Appendix C). There were no differences in the patterns of responses 
between the initial and the second request for participation letters. 
The five year time frame was selected for two reasons: First, 
five years was a sufficiently long period to observe trends in school 
board decisions (see Table 3) and in community voter participation and 
dissent (see Table 5) to be observed. Second, since this study is a 
partial replication of Minar's study of a five year period from 1958 
to 1962, a comparable period of time was used. Minar found no 
taxpayer's revolt in his study. However the years 1978 to 1982 might 
show a reflection of the national sentiment against taxes in general. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The letter to the superintendents introduced the researcher and 
explained the procedures necessary for participation. The purpose of 
the letter was to secure the cooperation of the superintendent in 
examining school board meeting minutes and election results for the 
years 1978 through 1982 (see Appendix A). 
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The questionnaire (see Appendix B) consisted of seven questions 
designed to obtain information about the school district and the 
municipality that it served, the numbers of school board members 
elected, referenda held in the district over the five years of the 
study, the nominating procedures used in the district for school board 
members, and the length of tenure of the superintendent in his present 
position. An additional purpose was to obtain the opinion of the 
superintendent concerning the kinds of issues about which the board of 
education chose to question administrative decisions. 
Questionnaires were sent to the superintendents of the 72 
elementary districts that had all schools within the district located 
in one town. Of the superintendents contacted, 56 percent, or 40, 
agreed to participate in the research. An additional 20 
superintendents chose not to participate, making the total response 
rate to the questionnaire 83 percent (see Appendix J). The 
questionnaire responses by county are shown in Table 1. 
County-by-county data, showing the characteristics of the 
superintendents and the presence or absence of a caucus system for 
nominating members to the board of education, are provided in Table 2. 
The length of tenure of the superintendents in their present position 
ranged from a high of 30 years to a low of less than one year. All of 
the superintendents were male. There was only one female 
superintendent in the original 72 districts. 
Data Collected in Each District 
Three instruments were used to collect data directly from the 
minutes of the school board in each district. The voting patterns of 
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each board (see Appendix D) were recorded by year, month, issue, and 
frequency. Split votes were noted by specific issue and vote. They 
were recorded, as they were encountered, in the margin of the voting 
patterns sheet. The second instrument used recorded school board 
election data (see Appendix E). The participation totals and the 
votes for the losing candidates were found in the official district 
records. Finally, referenda data (see Appendix F), for both tax rate 
increases or bond issues, were recorded. In most cases, the election 
data were in the official minutes of the board of education. If all 
the data were not recorded in the minutes, then it was necessary to 
open election envelopes and record the judges' tallies. Only two 
districts out of forty were unable to produce these voting totals. 
Data Collected Outside the School District 
Two additional sources of information were used to collect 
community data. The social variables of the communities comprising 
the school districts were taken from the United States Census Tracts: 
Chicago, Illinois, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (1983). 
They include educational level, occupational level, and income level 
for each census tract (see Appendix G). The census provided other 
information about the population, such as racial make-up and poverty 
statistics. These data were not used for the purposes of this study. 
The second source of outside data was the records of eligible 
voters in each school district for each election between 1978 and 
1982. This information was obtained from the records of the 
individual counties. Copies of these records were obtained from the 
office of voter registration in Chicago (Cook County), Waukegan (Lake 
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County), Joliet (Will County), Woodstock (McHenry County), and Wheaton 
(DuPage County). These eligible voters were recorded on both the 
election and referenda data sheets (see Appendices E and F). 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the 
social characteristics of a community and the ability of that 
community to control electoral conflict. 
Hypothesis 2a: Boards of education in all districts split their 
votes on all types of issues. 
Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on 
which school boards split their votes between those communities that 
ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of 
community members. 
Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that 
were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based 
on the voting patterns of their boards of education. 
Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the 
board of education acted as a conflict control device. 
Independent Variables 
Social Characteristics of Community Members 
Three social variables were added together to form the aggregate 
variable known as Community Social Rank (see Appendix H). The formula 
for determining this rank is: educational level + income level+ 
occupational level = social rank. The educational level of a 
community (school district) is the number of persons over 25 years of 
age with four or more years of college divided by the total population 
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over 25 years of age. Four or more years of college is the highest 
educational category recorded in the census. The income level of a 
community is computed by dividing the number of households with a 
yearly income over $50,000 by the total number of households. The 
income level of $50,000 or more is the highest level recorded in the 
census. The occupational level is the proportion of persons 
classified as professional/managerial per 1,000 employed persons. 
Managerial/professional is the highest category listed in the census 
for occupation. Because the status criteria were used consistently, 
the social rank score was considered comparable among the school 
districts. These three variables, educational level, occupational 
level, and income level, were added together to form the aggregate 
social rank score for each school district (see Appendix H). In his 
study, Minar used a similar formula for determining the social rank of 
communities. 
Local Election Results 
Aggregate Community Political Behavior was equal to voter 
participation plus voter dissent in both school board elections and 
referenda over the five years of the study. Participation indices 
were equal to the sums of votes cast divided by the number of eligible 
voters times the number of voting occasions. Election dissent indices 
were equal to the sums of votes cast for losing candidates divided by 
the sums of all votes cast in school board elections during the five 
year period. Referenda dissent indices were equal to the sums of "no" 
votes divided by the sums of all votes during the five years of the 
study (see Appendix I). The aggregates measured: (1) the interest of 
the community in school elections; and (2) the extent to which 
consensus failed (and conflict was not averted) before the formal 
election was reached. Minar developed the formulas for aggregate 
community political behavior. 
There were three sets of data from the local school districts. 
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The first set of data was the school board elections for the years 
1978 through 1982. Because of a consolidated election law passed in 
1980, which resulted in the cancellation of school board elections in 
1982, there were only four elections during the five year period under 
study (see Appendix E). Four categories of information were recorded: 
voter participation, the number of votes cast for losing candidates 
(listed as dissent), the total number of eligible voters (obtained 
from the county clerk's records), and the number of elections (only 
one in each year). 
The records of community voting in school referenda, on both tax 
rate increases and bond issues, were recorded in the same manner as 
school board elections. In the case of referenda, it is possible to 
conduct two elections per year on either tax rate increases or bond 
issues. Therefore, theoretically, ten elections were possible. In 
fact, some districts had no referenda in the five year period. The 
greatest number of referenda in any one district during the period was 
four (see Table 7). 
Decisions Made by the Board of Education 
As the third and final factor under study, specific decisions 
were taken from the votes of the board of education as recorded in the 
official minutes of the participating districts. They were 
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categorized into four major areas: (1) finance, (2) personnel, (3) 
curriculum, and (4) minor policies. The number of votes in each 
category was noted and the split votes were identified. These facts 
were recorded to obtain an accurate picture of the issues on which the 
board of education made decisions over the five year period from 1978 
through 1982. 
Dependent Variable 
Conflict 
The social characteristics of the community members (see Appendix 
H) and the aggregate community political behavior were computed (see 
Appendix I). A Kendall-Tau test for correlation was performed to 
determine if there was an association between community social status 
and electoral conflicts (see Table 8). 
The school districts were grouped into high, medium, and low 
according to their social rank scores (see Table 6). The high group 
scores were 400 and above. The middle group scores were 200 to 399 
and the low group scores were 0 to 199. The high and low groups were 
compared on percentage of split votes divided by total votes taken by 
the board of education on each of the four issues: (1) finance, (2) 
personnel, (3) curriculum, and (4) policies. Z scores were computed 
using a two-tailed test with Z 
(see Table 9). 
+ 1.96 as the level of significance 
Aggregate community political behavior (see Table 10) was 
compared to votes taken by the board of education (see Table 17). A 
Kendall-Tau test for correlation was used with an alpha level of .05. 
The results are listed in Table 18. 
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A Kruskal-Willis test was used to determine if the caucus method 
of nominating members to the board of education had an effect on th~ 
aggregate community political behavior of the district. The alpha 
level of .05 was established. The results are shown in Table 16. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
Research Questions 
This study was designed to test four major research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the 
social characteristics of a community and the ability of that 
community to control electoral conflict. 
Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all 
types of issues. 
Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on 
which school boards split their votes between communities that ranked 
high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of 
community members. 
Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that 
were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based 
on the voting patterns of their boards of education. 
Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the 
board of education acted as a conflict control device. 
Each hypotheses was tested separately and the results are 
presented in the tables located in this chapter. 
Profile of the Sample 
Forty school districts in the five county suburban Chicago area 
participated in the study: Will county, two districts; McHenry 
51 
52 
county, four districts; and Lake county, six districts; DuPage county, 
seven districts; and Cook county, 21 districts. All of the 
superintendents of these districts were male. Their length of tenure 
in their present job ranged from less than one year to 30 years. 
Nineteen of the districts employed a caucus for nominating members to 
the board of education and 21 did not (see Table 2). 
Table 1 presents the responses of the superintendents to the 
initial request for participation in the study by county. A breakdown 
of the total questionnaire responses is shown in Appendix J. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the 
social characteristics of a community and the ability of that 
community to control electoral conflict. 
The social characteristics of a community were found by computing 
a social rank score (see Appendix H) for each district using data from 
the 1980 Census (see Appendix G). The results of the computations are 
shown in Table 11. Next the communities were listed highest social 
rank to lowest social rank and divided into three groups: high, 
middle, and low (see Table 6). Electoral conflict was determined by 
finding the aggregate community political behavior (see Appendix I) 
for each district for the years 1978 through 1982. The electoral 
conflict of each district is shown in Table 10. Only 39 school 
districts were listed because one district had school board members 
who were appointed and over the five years of the study that district 
presented no referenda to the voters. 
In order to determine if there was a positive relationship 
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between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of 
that community to control electoral conflict, a Kendall-Tau test for· 
correlation was used (see Table 8). The data showed a correlation of 
-0.25526 between social rank and electoral conflict higher than the 
level of significance at which the hypothesis was to be accepted, .05. 
School districts that ranked in the high group for social status 
experienced lower levels of conflict as indicated by electoral 
dissent. The Kendall-Tau test was used because it is a nonparametric 
procedure designed to be used with ranked data. The correlation of 
-0.25526 was significant for a two-tailed test. Therefore, the 
hypothesis was accepted. 
Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all 
types of issues. 
The data collected from each school district confirmed the 
hypothesis that the boards of education split their votes on all types 
of issues. Table 4 lists each district and the numbers of split votes 
by issue for each district. 
Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on 
which school boards split their votes between those communities that 
ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of 
community members. 
The school districts were listed by their social rank score, and 
the number of split votes that the board of education had taken was 
listed by category. The four categories were finance, personnel, 
curriculum, and policies (see Table 12). The number of split votes 
was recorded by district and was listed in Table 4. 
The school districts were divided into three groups based on 
their social rank score (see Table 6). Scores below 199 were in the 
low group, scores between 200 and 399 were in the middle group, and 
scores 400 and above were in the high group (see Table 5). 
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The number of votes and split votes taken by the 12 districts 
that scored high in social rank and the 12 that ranked low are listed 
in Table 17. Table 13 lists the total votes taken by social rank for 
each district. 
Z scores, computed with the formula in Appendix K, are listed in 
Table 9. A two-tailed test with z = + 1.96 was used to compute each 
issue separately. In finance (z = 0.199), curriculum (z = 1.36), and 
policies (z = 1.50), there were no significant differences between the 
districts that were ranked high ad those that were ranked low 
socially. However, in personnel (z = 2.80), there was a significant 
relationship between high social rank and less conflict (as indicated 
by split votes of the board of education). The total z 1.650 was 
not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted. Z scores 
were used because they produce an accurate assessment of association 
between social rank and split votes. 
Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that 
were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based 
on the voting patterns of their boards of education. 
The aggregate data for both school board elections and referenda 
are presented by district in Table 5. The data, covering the years 
1978 through 1982, were obtained from the school board minutes in each 
district and from the office of the county clerk of the respective 
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counties. The data were recorded on sheets identical to Appendices E 
and F. 
For each district, electoral conflict was computed by using the 
formula described in Appendix I: Local Election Results. Each 
district was given an ECONF or aggregate community political behavior 
score (see Table 10). 
The districts were reranked according to aggregate community 
political behavior (ACPB), and the percentage of their split votes by 
total votes was computed (see Table 15). 
The Kendall-Tau test for correlation was used to determine if 
there was a relationship between the ability to control conflict and 
voting patterns of the board of education by issue. There were only 
37 cases in this analysis because data were missing from two districts 
and no elections were held in a third district. 
An alpha of .05 was selected using a two-tailed test. Finance 
(oe= -0.06399), curriculum (o<.= -0.03042), and policies(«= 0.16036), 
were not significant. Again, however, personnel was significant 
0.25345. There was a slight positive correlation between districts 
that were able to control conflict and votes on personnel issues. The 
total correlation was 0.10287 and was not significant. Therefore, the 
hypothesis was accepted. 
The Kendall-Tau test was used because of its ability to detect 
correlations based on ranked data. The results of this test are shown 
in Table 16. 
Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the 
board of education acted as a conflict control device. 
The school districts were categorized as either caucus or 
non-caucus by using the responses of superintendents on the 
questionnaires (see Table 7 for responses by individual district or 
Table 2 for responses by county). 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to see if the presence of a 
caucus in a school district produced lower electoral conflict. This 
nonparametric test for two groups was used because of its ability to 
detect differences between two groups. The Chi square approximation 
was 0.21 with one degree of freedom. The hypothesis was rejected with 
a probability of Chi square= 0.6485 (see Table 14). The presence of 
a caucus did not appear to affect conflict management (see Table 19). 
Therefore, the hypothesis was rejected. 
Table 1 
Questionnaire Responses by County 
County 1/: Sent 1f: Returned % Yes 
Cook 39 33 85 
Will 2 2 100 
DuPage 13 9 54 
Lake 9 6 67 
McHenry 9 4 44 
*Six additional questionnaires were returned as no participation, 
but no indication of school district was given therefore it was not 
possible to include those responses by county. 
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Table 2 
School Districts Responding Positively to the Questionnaire 
Positive Sex Avg Length Nominating Procedure 
County Responses M F of Tenure Caucus Non-Caucus 
Cook 21 21 0 7.1 Yrs. 10 11 
Dupage 7 7 0 7.4 Yrs. 6 1 
Lake 6 6 0 11.8 Yrs. 3 3 
McHenry 4 4 0 5.8 Yrs. 0 4 
Will 2 2 0 21.5 Yrs. 0 2 
Totals 40 40 0 8.5 Yrs. 19 21 
Issues 
Finance 
Personnel 
Curriculum 
Table 3 
Issues Upon Which the Boards of Education Voted 
Between 1978 and 1982: 40 District Totals 
Total No. of Votes No. of Split 
Taken Votes 
1660 40 
1294 43 
0396 24 
Niner Policies 1668 24 
Grand Total 5018 162 
% 
.024 
.033 
.060 
.032 
.032 
*For each district in each year two months of votes were recorded. 
This sampling was considered representative of the entire year. 
Year Months Recorded 
1978 Jan and Feb 
1979 Mar and Apr 
1980 May and Jun 
1981 Jul and Sep 
1982 Oct and Nov 
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Table 4 
School Board Split Votes 
Dist 
Code Fin Pers Curr Poli Total 
1 0 1 1 1 3 
2 2 0 2 0 4 
3 3 3 2 1 9 
4 1 0 0 0 1 
5 0 1 0 3 4 
6 2 0 0 0 2 
7 1 3 1 0 5 
8 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 2 1 0 4 
10 2 0 0 0 2 
ll 0 4 0 0 4 
12 3 1 1 2 7 
l3 1 1 1 0 3 
14 0 0 1 1 2 
15 0 1 0 0 1 
16 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 3 0 5 9 
18 0 0 0 2 2 
19 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 2 3 0 5 
2l 0 2 0 0 2 
22 6 6 1 7 20 
23 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 0 0 0 1 
25 6 1 3 0 10 
26 2 0 0 0 2 
27 0 0 0 0 0 
28 2 0 1 1 4 
29 2 2 0 0 4 
30 0 1 1 4 6 
31 0 1 0 0 1 
32 0 0 1 0 1 
33 0 2 0 2 4 
34 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 2 2 
36 0 0 1 3 4 
37 1 0 1 2 4 
38 0 1 1 0 2 
39 0 0 0 0 0 
40 3 5 1 10 19 
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Table 5 
Participation and Dissent by District 1978 thru 1982 
Dist School Board Elections Referenda Elections 
Code Participation: Dissent Participation: Dissent 
1 2016 423 2733 1785 
2 10596 11670 0 0 
3 2200 517 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 
5 1196 589 784 375 
6 3227 35 0 0 
7 DATA N.A. 396 0 0 
8 1727 221 1062 500 
9 1988 1317 0 0 
10 912 246 0 0 
11 1524 1143 0 0 
12 3603 212 0 0 
13 10951 4933 0 0 
14 693 364 5617 353 
15 1843 1140 0 0 
16 1099 697 0 0 
17 1453 711 0 0 
18 3069 3396 0 0 
19 1439 12 0 0 
20 2136 685 0 0 
21 3335 2326 10849 8743 
22 916 548 0 0 
23 967 41 0 0 
24 985 316 0 0 
25 876 667 883 119 
26 DATA N.A. 137 969 558 
27 723 252 0 0 
28 3607 1421 1804 1264 
29 6517 2844 0 0 
30 3486 2277 0 0 
31 858 791 0 0 
32 1927 449 0 0 
33 1168 764 0 0 
34 451 26 0 0 
35 DATA NOT AVAILABLE 1204 805 
36 668 409 0 0 
37 6140 4748 0 0 
38 811 28 0 0 
39 2570 787 1670 453 
40 1362 578 1120 556 
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Table 6 
Social Rank Score of School Districts 
School Code Social Rank Score Place in Sample Group 
19 657.639 1 
6 564.531 2 
39 548.406 3 
9 509.954 4 
4 502.868 5 High 
38 491.031 6 
12 466.821 7 
1 462.714 8 
32 448.604 9 
30 437.037 10 
20 431.215 11 
2 407.265 12 
34 399.700 13 
37 398.946 14 
36 374.429 15 
29 342.154 16 
10 337.710 17 
33 325.593 18 
3 315.330 19 
14 309.198 20 Middle 
18 301.507 21 
17 280.766 22 
24 240.767 23 
7 240.538 24 
21 239.603 25 
25 231.122 26 
26 207.011 27 
27 205.152 28 
35 194.508 29 
15 188.966 30 
40 187.019 31 
22 185.702 32 
31 184.499 33 
23 180.710 34 Low 
8 162.898 35 
5 157.627 36 
13 144.498 37 
16 123.126 38 
11 89.326 39 
28 70.385 40 
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Table 7 
Profile of Participating Districts 
Dist Quantity of No. of Supt. 
Code Referenda Caucus Schools Tenure 
1 1 Yes 3 7 
2 0 Yes 10 2 
3 0 No 4 12 
4 0 Yes 5 12 
5 1 Yes 1 4 
6 0 Yes 4 7 
7 0 No 1 10 
8 1 No 3 8 
9 0 Yes 3 5 
10 0 No 4 4 
11 0 No 3 5 
12 0 Yes 5 .5 
13 0 No 10 2 
14 3 No 3 4 
15 0 No 2 2 
16 0 No 2 18 
17 0 Yes 3 7 
18 0 Yes 8 5 
19 0 Yes 1 7 
20 0 Yes 8 15 
21 2 Yes 7 5 
22 0 No 2 6 
23 0 No 2 13 
24 0 No 3 5 
25 1 No 4 8 
26 3 No 1 8 
27 0 No 1 2 
28 1 No 3 25 
29 0 No 5 18 
30 0 Yes 5 10 
31 0 Yes 1 4 
32 0 Yes 7 30 
33 0 No 2 5 
34 0 No 3 10 
35 4 No 1 3 
36 0 Yes 11 16 
37 0 Yes 12 5 
38 0 Yes 2 .5 
39 1 Yes 2 16 
40 2 No 2 3 
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Table 8 
Kendall-Tau Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > :R: Under HO:RHO=O / Number of Observations 
soc ECONF 
soc l. 00000 -0.25526 
0.0000 0.0262 
39 37 
ECONF -0.25526 1.00000 
0.0262 0.0000 
37 37 
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Table 9 
Z Scores 
Number of Number of 
Issue Votes Splits Z Score 
Finance 905 19 z 0.199 
Personnel 840 27 z 2.800 
Curriculum 245 15 z l. 360 
Policies 1055 30 z 1.500 
Totals 3045 91 z 1.650 
*Two-Tailed Test z + 1.960 
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Table 10 
SOC and ECONF by Caucus Status 
OBS AGREF AGSB ECONF CAUC 
1 0.57983 0.26390 0.84372 1 
2 0.00000 0.44404 0.44404 0 
3 0.00000 0.28544 0.28544 0 
4 0.39395 0.46014 0.85409 1 
5 0.00000 0.35214 0.35214 1 
6 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0 
7 0.23656 0.31557 0.55213 0 
8 0.00000 0.35735 0.35735 1 
9 0.00000 0.17907 0.17907 0 
10 0.00000 0.39132 0.39132 0 
11 0.00000 0.19346 0.19346 1 
12 0.00000 0. 77180 0.77180 0 
13 0.74804 0.08441 0.83245 0 
14 0.00000 0.47349 0.47349 0 
15 0.00000 0.20859 0.20859 0 
16 0.00000 0.44305 0.44305 1 
17 0.00000 0.21165 0.21165 1 
18 0.00000 0.35484 0.35484 1 
19 0.00000 0.14858 0.14858 1 
20 1.38368 0.17983 1.56351 1 
21 0.00000 0.42154 0.42154 0 
22 0.00000 0.49912 0.49912 0 
23 0.00000 0.18989 0.18989 0 
24 0.26487 0.02759 0.29246 1 
25 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0 
26 0.00000 0.57070 0.57070 0 
27 0.43425 0.56790 1. 00216 0 
28 0.00000 0.47633 0.47633 0 
29 0.00000 0.33262 0.33262 1 
30 0.00000 0.73751 0.73751 1 
31 0.00000 0.19433 0.19433 1 
32 0.00000 0.97682 0.97682 0 
33 0.00000 0.07829 0.07829 0 
34 0.59463 0.64234 1. 23696 0 
35 0.00000 0.31641 0. 31641 1 
36 0.00000 0.26623 0.26623 1 
37 0.00000 0.21031 0. 21031 1 
38 0.27450 0.35984 0.63435 1 
39 1.08372 1.16086 2.24458 0 
AGREF = Aggregate Referenda Voting 
AGSB = Aggregate School Board Voting 
ECONF = Electoral Conflict 
CAUC - Caucus (1 = caucus; 0 = no caucus) 
ECONF = Aggregate Community Political Behavior 
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Table 11 
Social Rank Scores 
BS COLL P25 MP EHP IC HH soc 
1 3401 7464 2755 5963 979 4029 462.714 
2 13867 35226 11597 28508 1656 22480 407.265 
3 2660 10785 2695 8554 201 7651 315.330 
4 4679 9038 3563 7099 2179 4790 502.868 
5 387 3739 644 4089 56 2014 157.627 
6 5247 8414 3185 5653 2076 4238 564.531 
7 540 5168 905 3765 163 2649 240.538 
8 218 3274 506 3108 59 2273 162.898 
9 1719 2313 1309 2572 479 1788 509.954 
10 209 856 199 590 80 450 337.710 
11 32 960 63 706 33 570 89.326 
12 14006 31568 10581 22702 4648 15747 466.821 
13 696 10433 1046 7244 232 6520 144.498 
14 13 756 23 327 7 221 70.385 
15 696 5391 750 3973 178 2846 188.966 
16 554 8142 795 6462 162 5146 123.126 
17 681 3267 805 2871 292 1741 280.766 
18 3681 14538 4018 13341 663 8586 301.507 
19 1231 1589 731 1114 559 834 657.639 
20 4157 9372 3050 7085 1486 5219 431.215 
21 3965 19358 3475 14519 546 9715 239.603 
22 146 1477 208 1121 50 911 185.702 
23 61 513 76 421 20 292 180.710 
24 370 2013 412 1714 212 1012 240.767 
25 1248 7245 1348 5839 339 3850 231.122 
26 66 547 91 440 23 317 207.011 
27 299 1894 416 2030 99 1449 205.152 
28 182 712 185 599 37 394 309.198 
29 3905 13105 2799 8196 1268 3644 342.154 
30 4666 10280 3634 8327 1019 5955 437.037 
31 195 1668 292 1584 48 1249 184.499 
32 3590 7115 2699 6025 492 3710 148.604 
33 168 726 188 578 42 411 325.593 
34 1744 4511 1644 4118 248 2750 399.700 
35 78 591 95 489 34 334 194.508 
36 6055 19340 5923 15838 1460 10318 374.429 
37 7740 22262 7013 17599 1379 12548 398.946 
38 982 1951 752 1534 315 1028 491.031 
39 3259 5320 2217 4051 1437 2757 548.406 
40 206 1602 241 1290 62 903 187.019 
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Table 12 
Number of Split Votes Taken by School Board by Social Rank 
OBS soc FS PERS CURRS POLS TOTALS 
1 657.639 0 0 0 0 0 
2 564.531 2 0 0 0 2 
3 548.406 0 0 0 0 0 
4 509.954 1 2 1 0 4 
5 502.874 1 0 0 0 1 
6 491.031 0 1 1 0 2 
7 466.821 3 1 1 2 7 
8 462.714 0 1 1 1 3 
9 448.604 0 0 1 0 1 
10 437.037 0 1 1 4 6 
11 431.215 0 2 3 0 5 
12 407.265 2 0 2 0 4 
13 399.700 0 0 0 0 0 
14 398.946 1 0 1 2 4 
15 374.429 0 0 1 3 4 
16 342.154 2 2 0 0 4 
17 337.710 2 0 0 0 2 
18 325.593 0 2 0 2 4 
19 315.330 3 3 2 1 9 
20 309.198 2 0 1 10 13 
21 301.507 0 0 0 2 2 
22 280.766 1 3 0 5 9 
23 240.767 1 0 0 0 1 
24 240.538 1 3 1 0 5 
25 239.603 0 2 0 0 2 
26 231.122 6 1 3 0 10 
27 207.011 2 0 0 0 2 
28 205.152 0 0 0 0 0 
29 194.508 0 0 0 2 2 
30 188.966 0 1 0 0 1 
31 187.019 3 5 1 10 19 
32 185.702 6 6 1 7 20 
33 184.499 0 1 0 0 1 
34 180.710 0 0 0 0 0 
35 162.898 0 0 0 0 0 
36 157.627 0 1 0 3 4 
37 144.498 1 1 1 0 3 
38 123.126 0 0 0 0 0 
39 89.326 0 4 0 0 4 
40 70.385 0 0 1 1 2 
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Table 13 
Votes Taken in School Board Meetings 1978-1982 
OBS soc FT PERT CURRT POLT TOTAL 
1 657.639 33 24 6 28 91 
2 564.531 41 43 5 25 114 
3 548.406 42 36 11 41 130 
4 509.954 31 29 8 30 98 
5 502.874 46 44 6 25 121 
6 491.031 34 37 6 36 113 
7 466.821 43 51 8 47 149 
8 462.714 38 50 19 31 138 
9 448.604 17 31 6 32 86 
10 437.037 28 35 23 43 129 
11 431.215 38 48 18 34 138 
12 407.265 41 56 14 30 141 
13 399.700 54 23 5 46 128 
14 398.946 39 30 9 43 121 
15 374.429 57 14 17 40 128 
16 342.154 23 37 10 35 105 
17 337.710 39 37 4 34 114 
18 325.593 53 25 4 27 109 
19 315.330 56 48 26 43 173 
20 309.198 26 21 1 35 83 
21 301.507 54 22 33 46 155 
22 280.766 31 51 14 40 136 
23 240.767 67 19 4 47 137 
24 240.538 86 29 3 27 145 
25 239.603 46 26 5 38 115 
26 231.122 64 36 5 45 150 
27 207.011 34 12 3 36 85 
28 205.152 26 24 8 31 89 
29 194.508 50 17 5 75 147 
30 188.966 35 27 4 47 113 
31 187.019 43 35 11 54 143 
32 185.702 39 29 6 55 129 
33 184.499 35 14 5 38 92 
34 180. 710 56 41 34 40 171 
35 162.898 30 22 2 40 94 
36 157.627 27 31 8 44 110 
37 144.498 53 31 14 105 203 
38 123.126 33 44 6 78 161 
39 89.326 33 35 10 46 124 
40 70.385 39 30 10 31 110 
Level 
1 
0 
Table 14 
Analysis for Variable ACPB Classified by Variable Caucus 
Level 
1 
0 
N 
18 
19 
Analysis of Variance 
Mean 
0.53 
0.58 
Among MS 
0.0215743 
F Value 
0. 25 
Within HS 
0.0849123 
Prob > F 
0.6174 
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation) 
CHISQ = 0.21 DF = 1 PROB > CHISQ = 0.6485 
Median Scores (Number Points Above Median) 
Sum of Expected Std Dev Mean 
N Scores Under Ho Under Ho Score 
18 7.00 8.76 1.54 0.39 
19 11.00 9.24 1.54 0.58 
Median 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation) 
s = 7.00 z = -1.1399 Prob > :Z: = 0.2543 
Median 1-Way Analysis (Chi-Square Approximation) 
CHISQ = 1.300 DF = 1 PROB > CHISQ = 0.2541 
ACPB = Aggregate Community Political Behavior 
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Table 15 
School Board Voting Patterns 
OBS FS FT PERS PERT CURRS CURRT POLS POLT TOTALS TOTALT ACPB 
1 0.048780. 41 0.000000 56 0.14286 14 0.000000 30 0.028369 141 1.18840 
2 0.000000 54 0.000000 22 o·.ooooo 33 0.000000 46 . o.oooooo 155: 1.14800 
3 0.000000 35 0.071429 14 0.00000 5 0.000000 38 0 .• 010870 92 1.07175 
4 0.000000 53 0.080000 25 0.00000 4 0.074074 27 0.036697 109 0.86399 
5 0.000000 46 0.076923 26 0.00000 5 0.000000 38 0.·017391 115 0.86138 
6 0.000000 33 . 0.114286 35 0.00000 10 0.000000 46' 0.032253 124 0.83238 
7 0.025641 39 0.000000 30 0.11111 9 0.046512 43 0.033058 121 0.82907 
8 0.032258 31 0.068966 29 0.12500 8 0.000000 30 0.040816 98 0. 75396 
9 0.000000 28 o·.o28571 35 0.04348 23 0.093023 43 0.046512 129 0.72467 
10 0.000000 35 0.037037 27 0.00000 4 0.000000 47 0.008850 113 0.72108 
11 0.153846 39 0.206897 29 0.16667 6 0.127273 55 0.155039 129 0.68993 
12 0.000000 57 0.000000 14 0.05882 17 0.075000. 40 0.031250 128 0.68117 
13 0.000000 33 0.000000. 44 0.00000 6 0.000000 78 ·o.oooooo 161 0.67922 
14 0.000000 50 ·0.000000 17 0.00000 5 0.026667 75 0.013603 147 0.66266 
15 0.000000 39 0.000000 30 0.10000 10 0.032258 31 0.018182 110 0.66030 
16 0.018868 53 0. 0322,58 31 0.07143 14 0.000000 105. 0.014 773 203 0.62388 
17 0.069767 43 0.142857 35 0.09091 11 0.185185 54 0.132867 143 0.61691 
18 0.076923 26 0.000000 . 21 1.00000 1 0.285714 35 0.156627 83 0.59255 
19 0.032258 31 0.058824 51 0_.00000 14 0.125000 40 0.066176 136 0.58802 
20 0.000000 27 0.032258 31 0.00000 8 0.068182 44 0.036364 110 o. 57132 
21 0.086957 23 0.054054 37 0.00000 10 0.000000 35 0.038095 105 0. 54377 
22 0.000000 38 0.020000 50 0.05263 19 0.032258 31 . 0.021739 138 0.53993 
23 0.000000 56 0.000000 41 0.00000 34 0.000000 40 0.000000 171 0.53681 
24 0.000000 26 0.000000 24 0.00000 8 0.000000 31 0.000000 89 0.47979 
25 0.093750 64 0.027778 36 0.60000 5 0.000000 45 0.066667 150 0.45742 ...... ,_. 
Table 15 (continued) 
OBS FS FT PERS PERT CURRs· CURRT POLS POLT TOTALS TOTALT ACPB 
26 0.014925 67 0.000000 19 0.00000 4 0.000000 47 0.007299 137 0.36476 
27 0.000000 42 0.000000 36 0.00000 11 0.000000 41 0.000000 130 0.36118 
28 0.000000 38 0.041667 48 0.16667 18 0.000000 34 0.036232 138 0.35554 
29 0.000000 30 0.000000 22 0.00000 2 0.000000 40 0.000000 94 0.31543 
30 0.051282 39 0.000000 37 0.00000 4 0.000000 34 0.017544 114 0.31168 
31 0.053571 56 o:o62soo 48 0.07692 26 0.023256 43 o·.o52023 173 0.30240 
32 0.000000 17 0.000000 31 0.16667 6 0.000000 32 0.011628 86 0.27891 
33 0.069767 43 0.019608 51 0.12500 8 0.042553 47 0.046980 149 0.10650 
34 0.048780 41 0.000000 43 0.00000 5 0.000000 25 0.017544 114 0.09864 
35 0.000000 33 0.000000 24 0.00000 6 0.000000 28 0.000000 91 0.09687 
36 0.000000 34 0.027027 37 0.16667 6 0.000000 36 0.017699 113 0.08665 
37 0.000000 54 0.000000 23 0.00000 5 0.000000 46 0.000000 128 0.07694 
Table 16 
Kendall-Tau B Correlation Coefficients 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
ACPB 37 0.55875297 0.28836288 0.58801997 0.07694000 1.8840000 
FS 37 0. 2371285 0.03668273 0 0 0.1538461. 
PERS 37 0.03251184 0.04652403 0.01960784 0 0.2068965 
CURRS 37 0.08823862 0.-18888821 0 0 1.0000000 
POLS 37 0.03343121 0.06194037 . 0 0 0.2857142 
TOTALS 37 0.03278806 0.03950482 0.01818182 0 0.1566265 
PROB > :R: UNDER HO:RHO=O / N = 37 
FS -0.06339 
0.6156 
PERS 0.25345 
0.0391 
CURRS -0.03042 
0.8079 
POLS 0.16036 
0.2060 
TOTALS 0.10287 
0.3782 
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Table 17 
Total Votes and Split Votes 
HL=O 
FS 12 10.00000000 
FT 12 473.00000000 
PERS 12 19.00000000 
PERT 12 356.00000000 
CURRS 12 4.00000000 
CURRT 12 115. 00000000 
POLS 12 23.00000000 
POLT 12 653.00000000 
TOTALS 12 56.00000000 
TOTALT 12 1597.00000000 
PERCENTAGE TOTAL 3.5 percent 
HL=l 
FS 16 21.00000000 
FT 16 755.00000000 
PERS 16 16.00000000 
PERT 16 454.00000000 
CURRS 16 9.00000000 
CURRT 16 151.00000000 
POLS 16 25.00000000 
POLT 16 613.00000000 
TOTALS 16 71.00000000 
TOTALT 16 1973.00000000 
PERCENTAGE TOTAL 3.6 percent 
HL=2 
FS 12 9.00000000 
FT 12 432.00000000 
PERS 12 8.00000000 
PERT 12 484.00000000 
CURRS 12 11.00000000 
CURRT 12 130.00000000 
POLS 12 7.00000000 
POLT 12 402.00000000 
TOTALS 12 35.00000000 
TOTALT 12 1448.00000000 
PERCENTAGE TOTAL 2.4 percent 
HL=2 High Social Rank 
HL=l Middle Social Rank 
HL=O Low Social Rank 
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Table 18 
Percentage of Split Votes by Issue 
Dist 
Code FIN PERS CURR POLl Totals 
1 0 2 5.8 3.2 2.2 
2 4.8 0 14.2 0 2.8 
3 5.3 6.2 7.6 2.3 5.2 
4 2.1 0 0 0 0 
5 0 3.2 0 6.8 3.6 
6 4.8 0 0 0 1.7 
7 1.1 10.3 33.3 0 3.4 
8 0 0 0 0 0 
9 3.2 6.8 12.5 0 4 
10 5.1 0 0 0 1.7 
11 0 11.4 0 0 3.2 
12 6.9 1.9 12.5 4.2 4.6 
13 1.8 3.2 7.1 0 1.4 
14 0 0 10 3.2 1.8 
15 0 3.7 0 0 .8 
16 0 0 0 0 0 
17 3.2 5.8 0 12.5 6.6 
18 0 0 0 4.3 1.2 
19 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 4.1 16.6 0 3.6 
21 0 7.6 0 0 1.9 
22 15.3 20.6 16.6 12.7 15.5 
23 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1.4 0 0 0 . 7 
25 9.3 2.8 60 0 6.7 
26 5.8 0 0 0 2.3 
27 0 0 0 0 0 
28 7.6 0 100 2.8 4.8 
29 8.6 5.4 0 0 3.8 
30 0 2.8 4.3 9.3 4.6 
31 0 7.1 0 0 1 
32 0 0 16.6 0 1.1 
33 0 8 0 7.4 3.6 
34 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 2.6 1.3 
36 0 0 14.2 7.5 3.3 
37 2.7 0 11.1 4.6 3.3 
38 0 2.7 16.6 0 1.7 
39 0 0 0 0 0 
40 6.9 14.2 9 18.5 13.2 
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Table 19 
Dissent by Social Rank and Caucus Procedure 
Low Social Rank High Social Rank 
Low High Low High Total 
Dissent Dissent Dissent Dissent 
Caucus 
(usually no 
opposition) 0 1 7 4 12 
Caucus 
(usually 
opposition) 0 1 1 0 2 
No Caucus 7 3 0 0 10 
Totals 7 5 8 4 24 
Total 12 12 24 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study was designed primarily to provide information about 
the relationship among the social characteristics of community 
members, political conflict within the community on educational 
issues, and decisions made by the board of education. The conclusions 
were based on the results of the data analysis, and the implications 
were derived from the conclusions. 
Conclusions 
Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the 
social characteristics of a community and the ability of that 
community to control electoral conflict. 
The nonparametric Kendall-Tau test showed a correlation of 
-0.25526 between social characteristics and the ability to control 
electoral conflict. The hypothesis was accepted at the .05 level. 
The analysis of the data relating the social characteristics of 
the members of the community and the ability of that community to 
control electra! conflict on school issues supported the expected 
conclusion that the group of communities that ranked high on 
socioeconomic variables had lower levels of electoral conflicts than 
those that ranked low. There was negative correlation of -0.25526 
between social rank and conflict. 
In the current study, social status included three measures: 
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occupational level, income level, and educational level. The 
occupational level was based on the proportion of persons in a 
community who had completed four or more years of college compared to 
the total adult population of that community. Income level was 
computed by dividing the number of households with an income of 
$50,000 or more by the total number of households. The final measure 
of social status, occupational level, was based on a comparison of 
persons in managerial/professional occupations to the total number of 
employed persons. The findings of this study agree with Minar's 
(1966) earlier results. According to Minar, high-status communities 
are more successful at conflict control because their members possess 
conflict-management skills. Members of these communities were thought 
to be more able to examine issues rationally, to compromise for the 
common good, and to have a willingness to devote time to public 
service. 
Minar also suggested that high-status communities are better able 
to control conflict because their members have similar aspirations to 
one another and worked better together than those in the low social 
ranked group. Also, these communities seem to be more comfortable 
with a division of responsibility between the board of education and 
the superintendent. Because of their own employment experiences, 
members of the high-social-rank communities expect technical 
management ability on the part of the superintendent and grant him 
more discretionary authority. 
Another factor that might contribute to a higher level of 
conflict in the districts with a lower socioeconomic rank is the lack 
of opportunity for members of the community to acquire information 
about school-related matters. When community members must, out of 
economic necessity, devote their time to making a living, they are 
likely to have little discretionary time to keep abreast of school 
issues. Conflict often arises when citizens are misinformed or 
partially informed. 
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Another social factor that may be at work in the low-status 
communities is social conditioning. Persons raised by parents who did 
not experience success in school and did not place a high value on 
education in general might be less inclined to inform themselves on 
school issues when they became parents of school-age children. They 
might be less socially conditioned than members of high-status groups 
to take an active part in school affairs. 
Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all 
types of issues. 
The range of split votes by the members of the boards of 
education was small. The total split votes over the five years of the 
study ranged from zero to a high of 20. The data arranged in Table 4 
confirms the hypothesis that split votes occur on all types of issues. 
Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on 
which school boards split their votes between those communities that 
ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of 
community members. 
Using Z scores to compare the association between social rank and 
total split votes, a z 1.650 was not significant. Therefore, the 
hypothesis was accepted. 
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In both the high and low social rank communities, boards of 
education split their votes on each of the issues. In other words, 
there was no consistent pattern in the distribution of split votes in 
terms of issues. Regardless of community social status, each board 
acted on issues considering their individual merit. A comparison of 
the communities ranked high socioeconomically to those ranked low 
yielded a total z score of 1.650. A further breakdown of the total 
split votes by types of issue showed only one potentially significant 
statistic. On the issue of personnel, there were more split votes in 
high social rank communities than in low-ranking communities. 
However, the actual significance of this relationship is small because 
there were so few split votes (91 out of 3,045) that any conclusions 
based on these figures would be difficult to determine and defend. 
One possible explanation for the low level of split votes and the 
absence of a voting pattern, suggested in interviews with several of 
the superintendents, is that disagreemets and arguments among board 
members often take place in committee meetings, before full board 
meetings are convened. By the time the board is ready to take a 
formal vote, disagreements have been resolved and compromises have 
been reached. This process is in the best interests of the district 
to the extent that presenting a united front provides stability and 
instills public confidence in the capabilities of the board to manage 
the schools. 
Another reason for the strong tendency of boards of education to 
agree formally can be found in the way boards typically accomplish 
their work. In the case of the school boards in this study, members 
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met monthly or bimonthly to discharge their legal duty to direct the 
management of the schools. Meeting regularly and frequently, the 
members of the board had to develop mutual trust, respect, and an 
ability to work together and with the superintendent. Working 
together toward the common goal of providing the children of their 
community with the best possible educational services requires give 
and take on the part of board members. They must weigh their personal 
feelings, prejudices, and prerogatives against the greater good of the 
system. In short, board members need to work well together. 
Thus even though they may disagree and argue, attempt to persuade 
and dissuade each other, eventually they must bite the bullet and 
vote. It is at this time that they demonstrate their ability to 
provide leadership by putting forward a united front. Indirectly, 
they say to the community that they have gathered information, looked 
at the issue from every angle, proposed a myriad of solutions, and 
chosen the course of action that they believe is in the best interests 
of the greatest numbers of children in the school district. That is, 
they have done their best to be rational decision makers. They will 
try this plan, evaluate it, and begin again. The core of the issue is 
not in the numbers of split votes, but in the efforts of the members 
of the board before the vote is taken and in their desire to appear 
unified. 
Again, unlike community members, school board members engage in a 
comparatively low level of conflict, regardless of the social status 
of the community. The results in Table 18 show that the percentage of 
split votes was over 35 in only one instance. And in that case, the 
number of total votes (five) was too small to yield a significant 
statistic. 
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Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that 
were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based 
on the voting patterns of their boards of education. 
Using a Kendall-Tau test for correlation there was no significant 
correlation between voting patterns and electoral conflict. 
Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted. 
There was no significant relationship between the control of 
electoral conflict (ECONF, also identified in this study as ACPB, or 
aggregate community political behavior) and board voting patterns as 
measured by the number of split votes as a percentage of total votes. 
On further analysis of the data by issue, split votes on personnel 
issues were slightly correlated with electoral conflict. Here again, 
however, as in the case of the relationship between social rank and 
split votes, the percentages were so small that accurate conclusions 
could not be based on them. Thus, the relationship between electoral 
conflict and the final patterns of the boards of education was not 
really significant. One possible reason for this conclusion is that 
even though communities differ the functions of school boards are so 
similar and they work in such similar ways that the community conflict 
factor has no effect. The data gathered from the individual districts 
strongly support this hypothesis. Examination of the school board 
minutes of 40 districts showed that their patterns of voting were so 
similar that one could not possibly tell them apart. As Table 17 
indicates, both the high and low social rank districts (and therefore 
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the low and high conflict districts) had low levels of split votes. 
The high-status group formally disagreed on 2.4% of their votes, while 
the low group disagreed on 3.5%. In conclusion, the school boards in 
this study of suburban, small-to-medium-sized districts were more 
alike than they were different, at least in terms of their voting 
habits. 
Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the 
board of education acted as a conflict control device. 
The final purpose of this study was to determine whether the 
caucus system of nominating members to the school board acts as a 
conflict-control mechanism. The Kruskall-Wallis test did not indicate 
a significant relationship between conflict control and the use of a 
caucus system. Therefore, the hypothesis was rejected. 
Although Minar (1966) found that the caucus did control conflict 
in the districts that he investigated, this study found no significant 
relationship between the caucus/non-caucus variable and the electoral 
conflict variable. The presence or absence of a caucus did not alter 
the degree of electoral conflict in the districts examined. However 
the social rank of a school district is a significant indicator of 
caucus use because eleven of the twelve high-social-rank communities 
used a caucus. In the low-social-rank communities none of the school 
districts used a caucus system for nominating members to the school 
board (see Table 19). 
This conclusion has two possible explanations. The first 
involves the degree of sophistication of the individual caucus 
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systems. Although limited data were collected for this study on the 
individual caucus systems, the caucuses did vary among the districts. 
Responses to the questionnaire (see Appendix B) by the superintendents 
divided caucus districts further into those in which the caucus 
candidates usually or always ran unopposed and those in which the 
caucus candidates usually or always had opposition. In districts in 
which the slate ran unopposed, there was apparently greater consensus 
and perhaps greater unity of philosophy among community members. In 
contrast, in districts in which caucus nominees were opposed community 
members evidently had differing opinions and therefore less consensus 
(see Table 19). 
On the other hand, some school districts that had no caucus had 
other unofficial, informal methods of candidate selection that may 
have been as successful or more successful than caucuses in 
controlling conflict. One superintendent reported that the present 
school board served as a major selector of potential board members. 
Current members recruited their friends or other community members who 
they felt would make good board members. Superintendents questioned 
about their role in board member selection denied participating in 
even an informal process. This position of noninvolvement in the 
selection process by the superintendent appears to be prudent because 
it would weaken the superintendent's position if he/she were to 
support a losing candidate. 
Implications 
This study has implications for three groups. First, 
universities with programs for training prospective school 
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administrators can integrate some of the findings of this study into 
their curricula. Administrators who are familiar with the dynamics-of 
interpersonal relations, especially among school board members, will 
be better able to deal with their boards and work more cooperatively 
with them. Administrators who understand the influence of the 
demographics of a community on the relationship between its 
superintendent and the members of its board of education will be 
encouraged to ascertain the socioeconomic status of their communities 
in order to be able to anticipate the level of conflict that might 
arise in these communities. Furthermore, based on the conclusions in 
this study, if a superintendent does not wish or is not able to deal 
with community conflict, he could seek a position in a district with a 
high social rank. If, on the other hand, the superintendent is 
skilled in confict management, he/she might be in a position to choose 
from a wider range of school districts in which to work. 
Another important implication for persons involved in the 
training of school administrators concerns the way in which board 
members disagree as indicated by their split votes. From this study 
it is evident that board members will disagree at least part of the 
time. If a prospective administrator were aware that this 
disagreement was the norm, then his/her expectation would be one of 
acceptance rather than one of concern. This realization would also 
act as a signal to the administrator that if the level of disagreement 
between board members became intense, there would be some type of 
strong force at work that probably would require careful attention. 
Second, for those responsible for the administration of schools, 
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this study provides information about some of the factors that are 
under the control of the superintendent and about some that are not~ 
The superintendent can play an informal, unofficial role in candidate 
nomination. He/she can encourage or discourage the formation of a 
caucus in his/her school district. And he/she can influence the votes 
of the school board by carefully selecting and ordering items on the 
agenda. On the other hand, the superintendent cannot influence the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the community members. He can be 
aware of those characteristics, however, and he can take them into 
consideration in planning the extent to which and the method by which 
he provides information and guidance for the school board and the 
community in general. In his conclusions, Minar (1966, p. 835) linked 
low electoral conflict districts with an ability to manage conflict. 
He believed that the continued professionalization of American society 
would lead to a greater ability of communities to control conflict. 
The fact remains, however, that according to the data generated by 
this 1984 study, school districts still reflect different resources in 
conflict-management skills. This may be due to the fact that there 
was a variety of communities included in the study or perhaps to the 
fact that some communities were diverse internally and were trying to 
accomodate a wider spectrum of members. 
Practicing school administrators can use the information 
generated by this study when dealing directly with their boards of 
education. It is apparent that members of school boards attempt to 
work cooperatively. This fact is a great asset to the administrator 
because he/she can depend for the most part on the board of education 
to agree on most issues. The willingness of board members to agree 
offers the opportunity to concentrate on solving problems in a 
productive and meaningful way. An attitude of cooperation can go a 
long way in promoting realistic solutions to difficult problems. 
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Third, for school board members or prospective members this study 
provides an insight into the way in which boards tend to agree in 
public. Most boards have established a cooperative relationship with 
their superintendents that has produced effective school systems. 
They have learned to divide responsibility between themselves and 
school administrators. Boards of education did split their votes on 
all types of issues even though these splits were infrequent. This 
fact might be explained by honest differences of opinions between 
board members. Since there was no difference in the types of issues 
on which the boards split their votes, split votes occasionally would 
be expected in the normal functioning of a board of education. The 
task of running the schools would seem to be facilitated by this 
spirit of cooperation and board members could have confidence in one 
another and themselves as a group to work for the common good of the 
children in the school district. 
The board would also appear to have enough confidence in their 
administrators to grant them latitude in decision-making. Confidence 
in the superintendent would be essential and seem to be indicated by 
the actions of the majority of the school boards included in this 
study. Taking into consideration the length of tenure of the 
superintendents of the districts (see Table 2), the board of education 
could expect a stable relationship with its administration. 
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Recommendations 
Four questions were answered in this study and four 
recommendations will be presented. First, since there was a positive 
relationship between social characteristics of community members and 
control of electoral conflict it would be important to be aware of the 
demographics of a community. In the higher socioeconomic districts 
little or no outward community electoral conflict would be expected. 
However, in the lower socioeconomic districts more conflict would be 
the norm. Both board members and administrators would use this 
information when planning their strategies for presenting issues to 
the community. It might be helpful to provide what might seem to be 
an overabundance of information to the voters in the lower 
socioeconomic districts. The voters might then be in a better 
position to make decisions based on the facts available. Conflict in 
this type of district should be expected and strategies developed to 
deal with it constructively. 
Second, since all boards of education split their votes over some 
issues one would consider the split vote not as a negative indication 
but as a matter of course in any type of district. The main point 
being that it is not necessary to have consensus on each and every 
issue that a board votes upon. Because people are different and have 
different perspectives there will naturally be some differences of 
opinion and these differences should be considered as a normal 
occurance. 
Third, since there were no differences in the voting patterns of 
the boards of education between those districts who were able to 
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control electoral conflict and those who were not it may be assumed 
that the presence or absence of conflict does not carry over to 
actions taken during normal board meetings. It would appear to be a 
great advantage to the administration and board and ultimately to the 
children of a school district that business go on as usual even after 
a contested election or opposition to a referenda. Even though 
dealing with conflict can be difficult and time consuming, board 
members, administration, and public can all have confidence that no 
matter the outcome, the system is able to continue to perform its 
vital function of governing the schools. It is recommended therefore 
that persons in a district that is experiencing conflict can expect 
that in the end the conflict will be resolved and that their 
institutions, the schools, will survive and thrive. 
Finally, the caucus system for nominating members to the school 
board was not related to the control of conflict in the districts 
studied. This finding would prompt two recommendations. First, a 
caucus may or may not be necessary in a specific district depending on 
the history of the district and the level of involvement of the 
community. Second, perhaps other methods of selecting candidates for 
school board membership should be encouraged. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This study has prompted four recommendations for further study 
based on the data that were examined. 
1. Since this present study included only small to medium sized 
districts, it would prove useful to examine what effect, if any, the 
size of the district has on the relationship among community social 
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characteristics, electoral conflict, and board of education decisions. 
A future study could include large city districts. 
2. Because this current study was conducted in one geographic 
location and included suburban school districts, different results 
might be obtained in other areas of the United States. Therefore, it 
is recommended that future studies include either more rural districts 
or other sections of the United States. 
3. The internal composition of a school district might have an 
influence on the actions of community members or on the board of 
education. A future study might examine a district or several 
districts to find out if a variety of socioeconomic groups make up a 
community or if the community is primarily composed of one social 
group. Then a future study might focus on only those districts who 
were internally alike or conversely it might focus on only those 
districts who were internally different. 
4. Finally, another aspect that could be explored in future 
studies is that of the internal workings of the board of education. 
It would prove useful for future researchers to focus on the 
relationships among the members of one board of education in order to 
determine just what factors influence their ability to work together. 
Bibliography 
Adkison, J.A. (1982). Electoral conflict its effects on voter turnout 
and school board decision-making style. Urban Education, 16(4), 
425-448. 
Banfield, E.C., & Wilson, J.Q. (1963). City politics. New York: 
Vintage. 
Blanchard, P.D. (1977). If you're jittery or embarrassed because your 
school board is 'divided', maybe you shouldn't be. American School 
. Board Journal, 164, 34-35. 
Boyd, W.D. (1976a). Community status and conflict in suburban school 
politics. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Boyd, W.D. (1976b). The public, the professionals, and educational 
policy making: Who governs? Teachers College Record, 77(4), 
539-578. 
Burris, Q.G.(l969). Search for school board talent. American School 
Board Journal, 156, 12-14. 
Campbell, R.F., Cunningham, L.L., Nystrand, R.O., & Usdan, M.D. 
(1975). The organization and control of American schools. 
Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill. 
Cistone, P.J. (1977). The socialization of school board members. 
Educational Administration Quarterly, 13(2), 19-33. 
Cistone, P.J. (1978). School board members learn their skills before 
they become board members. American School Board Journal, 165, 
32-33. 
Cronin, J.M. (1965). The politics of school board elections. Phi 
Delta Kappan, 46, 505-509. 
Foskett, J.M. (1962). A comparative study of community influence. In 
D.E. Tope (Ed.), A forward look: The preparation of school 
administrators (pp. 115-130). Eugene: University of Oregon. 
Foster, L.S. (1983). Political culture a determinant of public 
regardingness among school board members. Urban Education, 18(1), 
29-39. 
Goldhammer, K. (1955). Community power structure and school board 
membershp. American School Board Journal, 130, 23-25. 
Goldhammer, K. (1964). The school board. New York: The Center for 
Applied Research. 
91 
92 
Gross, N. (1958). Who runs our schools? New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Hurwitz, M.W. (1972). What works best: An elected or an appointed 
school board? American School Board Journal, 157, 21-23. 
Iannaccone, L., & Lutz, F.W. (1970). Politics, power, and policy: The 
governing of local school districts. Columbus, OH: Charles E. 
Merrill. 
Kerlinger, F.N. (1973). Foundations of behavioral research. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 
Kerr, N.D. (1964). The school board as an agency of legitimation. 
Sociology of Education, 38, 34-59. 
Lawrence, P.R. (1965). Caucus committees: Their status, structure, 
operational procedures, and effectiveness in nominating candidates 
for boards of education in selected school corporations in Indiana. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University. 
Lutz, F.W. (1980). Local school board 
political-anthropological analysis. 
12(4), 452-465. 
decision-making: A 
Education and Urban Society, 
Lutz, F.W., & Iannaccone, L. (Eds.). (1978). Public participation in 
local school districts. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath. 
McCarty, D.J. (1959). School board membership: Why do citizens serve? 
Administrator's Notebook, 8, 1-4. 
Milton, S. (1983). Participation in local school board elections: A 
reappraisal. Social Science Quarterly, 64(3), 646-654. 
Minar, D.W. (1966). The community basis of conflict in school system 
politics. American Sociological Review, 31, 822-835. 
Mitchell, D.E., & Badarak, G.W. (1977). Political ideology and school 
board politics. Urban Education, 12, 55-83. 
Muns, A.C. (1961). A study of caucus committee procedures for 
nominating candidates for board of education in Cook, DuPage, and 
Lake Counties, Illinois. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. 
Muns, A.C. (1964). Removing the element of chance from selection of 
school board candidates. American School Board Journal, 148, 
14-15. 
Murphy, J.A. (1977). The school election in Illinois. Illinois 
Association of School Boards, Springfield, Illinois. 
93 
North, J.T. (1970). A study of Indiana school corporations using the 
caucus committee method of nominating candidates for school boar4s. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University. 
Nussel, E.J. (1965). A functional analysis of school-community 
conflict (Doctoral dissertation, Wayne State University, 1964). 
Dissertation Abstracts International, 25, 5640A. 
Roth, L. (1983). Is your board really a part of the management team? 
Thrust, 12, 42-43. 
Schnore, L.F., & Alford, R.R. (1963). Forms of government and 
socioeconomic characteristics of suburbs. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 8, 1-7. 
Stelzer, L. (1972). School board receptivity: A representation study. 
Education and Urban Soiciety, 5, 69-90. 
Stelzer, L. (1974). Institutionalizing conflict responses: The case 
of school boards. Social Science Quarterly, 55(2), 380-393. 
Taebel, D.A. (1977). Politics of school board elections. Urban 
Education, 12, 153-166. 
Touerstein, H. (1963). A system for nominating members of boards of 
education. American School Board Journal, 146, 11. 
Tuttle, E.M. (1958). School board leadership in America. Danville: 
Interstate. 
Wickert, D.M. (1982). How to work with your school board. Thrust, 
12, 32-33. 
Wirt, F.M., & Kirst, M.W. (1972). Political and social foundations of 
education. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan. 
Zakariya, S.B. (1983). Count the ways to keep your great 
superintendent productive and contented. American School Board 
Journal, 170(10), 27-29. 
Zeigler, L.H., Tucker, H.J., & Wilson, L.A., II. (1976). School 
boards and community power: The irony of professionalism. 
Intellect, 105, 90-92. 
APPENDIX A 
----------, Superintendent 
School District Name and Number 
7855 Greenfield 
River Forest, Illinois 60305 
January 18, 1984 
School District Street Number and Name 
Town, Illinois Zip Code 
Dear ----------: 
This letter is a request for your participation in my doctoral 
research study. 
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I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago working on my 
dissertation in educational administration and supervision. In order 
to analyze the decision making functions of boards of education, I am 
seeking information from superintendents in the five county suburban 
Chicago area. Included with this letter is a brief questionnaire. 
If you are willing to participate in this research, please 
( 1) Complete the questionnaire 
(2) Return it to me (postage paid envelope included) before 
January 27, 1984 
(3) Be willing to allow me to inspect your election results 
years 1978 to 1982 
(4) Be willing to allow me to examine the voting records of 
board between 1978 and 1982. 
All information will be strictly confidential. 
Thank you in advance for your support and participation. 
Gail Duke 
Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Education 
Loyola University 
for the 
your 
APPENDIX B 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
NO. 1 
Does your school district have the same physical boundaries as a 
municipality? YES NO 
If yes, which town? ..•••.•......•...•••....•......•...•.....•.•.....• 
If no, list the towns and the approximate proportions of each .......• 
NO. 2 
During the years 1978 to 1982 how many school board elections were 
he 1 d ? •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Number of people elected 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
NO. 3 
During the years 1978 to 1982 did the school district present 
referenda to the community? YES NO 
If yes, how many? ......•.•. 
If yes, what type? .•.••...• 
referenda pass fail 
19 7 8 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
19 7 9 .•.•.•...•.•.•..•.•..•••.• 
1980 ••••...•.••••...••.....•.. 
1981 ••••.•..••....•.•....••••. 
1982 . ........................ . 
If no, please continue questions. 
NO. 4 
bond issue pass fail 
How are the candidates nominated for the board of education in your 
district? 
a. caucus and usually or always unopposed by independents 
b. caucus and usually or always opposed by independents 
c. no caucus in operation 
d. other (please explain) 
NO. 5 
On what kinds of issues is the board most likely to question 
administrative decisions and actions? 
no questions board wants input 
a. finance 
b. personnel, hiring 
c. minor policies 
d. curriculum 
e. nothing 
f. other (please be specific) 
NO. 6 
How long have you been superintendent of this school 
district? •.••.•.•••.•.•.••......•.••.•••....•....•••••...•••.•...•. 
NO. 7 
Signature of the superintendent ...•••.••••••.••.•.....••••...•..•. 
Name and number of school district 
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APPENDIX C 
----------, Superintendent 
School District Name and Number 
7855 Greenfield 
River Forest, Illinois 60305 
February 8, 1984 
School District Street Number and Name 
Town, Illinois Zip Code 
Dear ----------: 
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This letter is a follow-up request for your participation in my 
doctoral research study. I originally wrote to you on January 18, 
1984 seeking your help. If you wish to participate I would appreciate 
your prompt reply, if you do not wish to participate I would 
appreciate the return of the questionnaire. 
I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago working on my 
dissertation in educational administration and supervision. In order 
to analyze the decision making functions of boards of education, I am 
seeking information from superintendents in the five county suburban 
Chicago area. Included with this letter is a brief questionnaire. 
If you are willing to participate in this research, please 
(1) Complete the questionnaire 
(2) Return it to me (postage paid envelope included) before 
February 17, 1984 
(3) Be willing to allow me to inspect your election results 
years 1978 to 1982 
(4) Be willing to allow me to examine the voting records of 
board between 1978 and 1982. 
All information will be strictly confidential. 
Thank you in advance for your support and participation. 
Gail Duke 
Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Education 
Loyola University 
for the 
your 
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Voting Patterns of Board of Education 
School District Code: Year: 
Month Issue Yes No 
Finance 
Personnel 
Curriculum 
Minor Policies 
APPENDIX E 
YEAR 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Participation 
School District Code 
SAMPLE ELECTION DATA SHEET 
SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS 
Dissent # of Elig Voters 
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1f of Elec 
APPENDIX F 
Year 
1978 
tax rate 
bond 
1979 
tax rate 
bond 
1980 
tax rate 
bond 
1981 
tax rate 
bond 
1982 
tax rate 
bond 
Participation 
School District Code 
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SAMPLE REFERENDA DATA SHEET 
Dissent 4f of Elig Voters 4f of Elec 
APPENDIX G 
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CENSUS INFORHATION DATA RECORD SHEET 
TOWN 
DISTRICT 1t 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
Population over 25 
Number of people over 25 4 or more years of college 
OCCUPATION 
Managerial/Professional 
Number of employed persons 
INCOME 
Income (household) over 50,000 
Number of households 
APPENDIX H 
Social Rank 
Social Characteristics of Community Members 
Formula for Community Social Rank 
Educational Level (EL) + Occupational Level (OL) + 
Income Level (IL) 
Educational Level (EL) 
110 
The number of persons over 25 years of age with four or more years of 
college (PC+4) divided by the total population of the school district 
(TP). 
EL = PC+4 
TP 
Occupational Level (OL) 
The number of persons classified as professional/managerial (PM) 
divided by the total number of employed persons (TE) per 1,000 
persons. 
PM = X ~---TE 1,000 
Income Level (IL) 
The number of households with a yearly income of $50,000 (H50,00+) or 
more divided by the total number of households (TH). 
IL = H50,000 
TH 
APPENDIX I 
Local Election Results 
Aggregate Community Political Behavior 
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Aggregate Community Political Behavior (ACPB) = Participation + 
dissent indices in both school board elections and referenda over the 
five years of the study. 
ACPB = PI + EDI + RDI 
Participation Indices (PI) = sums of votes cast divided by the number 
of eligible voters times the number of voting occasions over the five 
years of the study. 
PI = v1 + v2 + v3 + v4 + 
(El + Ez + E3 + E4 ). 4 + 
VR1 + VRz + VR3 + VR4 + VRs 
El + Ez + E3 + E4 + ES 
Election Dissent Indices (EDI) = sums of votes cast for losing 
candidates divided by the sums of all votes cast over the five years 
of the study. 
EDI = VL1 + VLz + VL3 + VL4 
VAl + VAz + VA3 + VA4 
Referenda Dissent Indices (RDI) = sums of "no" votes cast divided by 
sums of all votes cast over the five years of the study. 
RDI = NV1 + NVz + NV3 + NV4 + NV5 
VAR1 + VARz + VAR3 + VAR4 + VARs 
vl Total votes cast in 1978 in either school or referenda or both. 
vz Total votes cast in 1979 in either school or referenda or both. 
v3 Total votes cast in 1980 in either school or referenda or both. 
v4 Total votes cast in 1981 in either school or referenda or both. 
Vs Total votes cast in 1982 in either school or referenda or both. 
El ... Es = Total persons eligible to vote in years 1978-1982 
respectively. 
VL1 VL4 Sums of votes cast for losing candidates in years 
1978-1981. 
VA 1 VA4 Sums of all votes cast in school board elections in 
years 1978-1981. 
NV1··· NVs =Sums of "no" votes cast in referenda in years 1978-1982. 
VAR 1 ••. VAR5 =Sums of all votes cast in referenda in years 
1978-1982. 
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Total Questionnaire Responses 
First Mailing 
Total Sent Responses 
Yes No Total 
72 30 5 35 
Second Mailing 
Total Sent Responses 
Yes No Total 
37 8 13 21 
Late Responses 
Yes No Total 
2 2 4 
Grand Totals Responses 
Yes No Total 
40 20 60 
Positive Responses: 40 of 72 56% 
Total Responses: 60 of 72 83% 
APPENDIX K 
H = 
n1 
~ FORMULA 
1 L = 2 
n2 p1 P2 n .. 
~ 1P2 - p1 1 - ~ ( 1. 
n1 
-lp q ( 1 + 1 ) 
n1 n2 
II Split 
H: n1 s1 
1: n2 82 
Total n 1 + n2 s1 82 
oL = • 05 -? ex. . 025 
2 
~ 
-1.96 1.96 
• '. Reject H0 if ~ ) 1. 96 
or~<. -1.96 
p q 
+1.) 
n2 
p 
p1 
P2 
p~ q = 1 
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